Transformational Safety®
Culture & Leadership Assessment Report
Aardvark Cement Products
January 2012 – April 2012

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Transformational Safety®
Culture & Leadership Report

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January 2012 – April 2012

Prepared by TransformationalSafety.Com

Compiled in May 2012 by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between January and April of 2012, Aardvark Cement Products, located at Safetyville, New Hazard Township, recognised the value to be gained by an exploration of their safety management practices and contracted TransformationalSafety.Com® to undertake an assessment of its safety culture. The willingness of the business to expose itself to the level on introspective investigation that The Transformational Safety Culture and Leadership Assessment entails, indicates a mature organisation, willing to develop to its potential by way of identifying underlying improvement opportunities. This is to be commended.

The primary objective of the Assessment was to provide information regarding the presence, or absence, of safety culture characteristics at Aardvark Cement Products. Further, an investigation into the presence, and perceived frequency, of Transformational Safety® Leadership competencies was also undertaken.

The assessment strategy implemented within Aardvark Cement Products consisted of a two-fold approach.

Firstly, the Transformational Safety® Culture and Leadership Surveys were utilised as a quantitative data collection tool within Aardvark Cement Products. A significant percentage of the workforce (approx 97%), employed by Aardvark Cement Products at that time, participated in the wireless survey collection process. This demonstrates an extremely high level of commitment to the process.

The second stage of the TransformationalSafety.Com Integrated Safety Culture Assessment involved the collection of qualitative data from a random subset of the workforce. This was achieved via focus group initiatives undertaken during March – April 2012 by the author.

Aardvark Cement Products shows itself to be a traditional culture heavily based in transactional management behaviours. Employee perceptions throughout almost all Transformational Safety® Culture characteristics found themselves well placed in the Amber Zone on the SAFE-T-PLEX©. What this means is that if Aardvark Cement Products wished to re-engineer its organisation toward the demonstrated outcomes associated with transformational cultures, there are focussed interventions that would well be indicated.

Transformational Safety® Culture is consistently Amber; with some visiting of the Red Zone. It is no coincidence that TransformationalSafety.Com has anecdotally labelled the Red Zone, the “Dead Zone”. You do not want to be here, and the organisation should be exploring the issues around change management; particularly in reference to safety matters. The acquisition of a new CEO after twelve (12+) years of stable leadership, coupled with the recent resignation of the Safety Director and the pending retirement of the Operations Superintendent, leaves an organisation very much exposed in the area of change management. It is no coincidence that all the major safety management models in the World, including the Process Safety Model, nominate effective change management as a key element on the road to avoiding disaster.

There are a number of other areas that whilst not Red; are on the passive side of Amber. These areas shall also benefit from further introspection. The first step in this process is for Aardvark Cement Products to explore the individual data reports¹, whilst also embracing the further content of this document.

Transformational Safety® Leadership shows itself to similarly be heavily transactional with frequent optimal profiles within “The Policeman” and “The Dealer”. There are some identified issues with “invisibility” and “fire-fighting” within some slices of the organisation. These are concerning and would benefit greatly from further attention. The Transformational Safety® Leadership constructs are universally Amber at Aardvark Cement Products – some trending toward Red. This organisation shall benefit from direct and sustained interventions to specifically target transformational safety® leadership competencies.

¹ The individual data reports are contained within the accompanying CD-ROM Support Disk.
Safety outcomes, as measured by The Transformational Safety® Culture and Leadership Survey, show that there are generally not many perceived “Safety Champions” within the organisation, indeed the only “Safety Champion” identified by operational personnel was the now resigned Safety Director.

This area would greatly benefit from attention also, as research clearly shows the more active conversations occurring throughout all levels of the organisation around safety, the more “involved” is the workforce, and the less likely system events shall occur. Risk assessment and risk management are also not as “front of mind” as they should be for optimal performance. There would be value in considering the inclusion of the SAFE-T-START and SAFE-T-SCAN technologies within Aardvark Cement Products; supported conjointly with specific exposure to the SAFE-T-COACH safety leadership development intervention.

Within the Safety Engagement measure, developed by TransformationalSafety.Com, it becomes powerfully evident that there is some significant variance in the levels of “engagement”, with reference to the safety journey. Focus group involvement, actual survey profiles, and the safety engagement metric make this very clear. The clearest demonstration of this observation is within the Administration area. Having made that point, it is not an uncommon observation that office/administration based personnel often do not see their own relationship with workplace health and safety as being all that significant. This is always a “belief” that should be challenged. The most expensive workplace injury to manage generally has its aetiology within office/administration work environments.

TransformationalSafety.Com has adopted the generic safety cultural framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The IAEA framework purports to suggest that safety needs to demonstrate a visible difference within the following dimensions:-

- Safety is a clearly recognised value in the organisation
- Accountability for safety in the organisation is clear.
- Safety is integrated into all activities in the organisation.
- A safety leadership process exists in the organisation.
- Safety culture is learning driven in the organisation.

As indicated, the methodology involved obtaining a variety of quantitative and qualitative information, using multiple data-gathering methods. The information collected is largely based upon the perceptions of the individuals in the organisation. The safety culture assessment is a ‘point in time’ snapshot of Aardvark Cement Products; nevertheless it should also be recognised that cultural beliefs and assumptions rarely change quickly. At this point it would be remiss not to recognise that Aardvark Cement Products has recently been part of one of the most significant changes to occur within its history. It is quite likely, and focus group comment has suggested, that some of the fundamental “belief systems” within the business have undergone significant modification over the preceding two (2) years.

The results of this Safety Culture Assessment indicate that there are aspects of the generalised five safety culture characteristics present at Aardvark Cement Products. In order to ensure the long-term promotion of a robust safety culture at Aardvark Cement Products, increased attention to these areas for improvement and further corrective measures are indicated. In particular:

- Safety is a clearly recognised value in the organisation although it is inconsistently accepted and understood across all levels of personnel; with competing belief systems operating as regards motivations for corporate safety. The majority of staff throughout the organisation report a believed financial motivation rather than a humanistic one. A significant number of staff reported feeling that it appears to be a “numbers game”. The numerical targets, that are felt to be assertively promoted were offered in support of the view. Development of safety leadership behaviours, at all levels of personnel, is indicated. This relationship is multifaceted and require the company’s management to adopt a humanistic approach; an approach that is not overly focused on the numerical results but rather the underlying beliefs and motivations that are driving the results.

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2 Occupational Stress
levels, consistent with The Knight and The Missionary shall go a long way toward beginning this journey of visible and felt values based safety leadership.

• Accountability and personal ownership for safety are not yet universally accepted within the organisation. Although some individuals readily accept responsibility and take ownership of problems, others would appear to be still reluctant to do so. This was evidenced at all levels. There may well be value in exploring aspects of behavioural safety programs within Aardvark Cement Products with special reference to education around the ABC Model of BBS. Antecedent → Behaviour → Consequence

• An integrated and cohesive organisational safety leadership process does not yet exist. Whilst at a documentary level that may be so, it is not reported at a functional level. It must be acknowledged that the values and attitudes of the workforce are generally positive, but the many differences found between departments, and between management and staff, indicate that personnel are not yet aligned with a common set of safety focussed values.

• Whilst Safety appears to be well integrated into many activities within the organisation there appears to be significant inconsistency in style and delivery. Aardvark Cement Products should consider paying special attention to the deliberate inclusion of a safety leadership development program for frontline and mid level supervisors. It is from within these areas that the “rubber hits the road” with respect to effective safety leadership.
  ▪ It would be recommended that any such intervention be piloted within the operational work areas.
  ▪ Special care is required in the identification of participants for the program; to ensure that both structural and “natural” leaders are recognised and encouraged to participate
  ▪ It should be recognised that safety leadership is a different construct to traditional leadership development.

• That Aardvark Cement Products implement a behaviourally focused safety observation program (SAFE-T-SOS), in partnership with the identified development around Transformational Safety Leadership.

• That Aardvark Cement Products explores an effective safety recognition program (SAFE-T-SCRATCH), and develops their supervisory structure in appropriate use of the program. This program would be developed and implemented following the successful integration of earlier recommendations.

• That Aardvark Cement Products give thought to the optional development of a “Safety College” within the organisation.
  ▪ The Syllabus of the Safety College would be determined by regulatory requirement, need analysis, employee/safety committee recommendation, and employer need.
  ▪ Funding for The Safety College would be split between regulatory and discretionary safety development programs.
  ▪ In any one year there is a goal to provide a defined percentage of safety training as discretionary programming; eg not First Aid, Confined Spaces, Chain Saw Use, Traffic Control etc. – eg time management, negotiation skills, conflict resolution, lifestyle health management etc

• By delivering training under a College structure, Aardvark Cement Products is able to enhance the perception of the qualification being gained, is able to more visibly promote “safety” as warranting directional focus (not just another training program), and has the potential to develop a safety “brand”; both within and outside of the organisation.
  ▪ There was clear evidence that the training conducted within the organisation was seen to be insufficient by the majority of the workforce.
  ▪ People often said that the approach of putting people in a room with a video was not considered to be effective training.
• The senior management at Aardvark Cement Products generally were positively regarded by subordinate levels within the workforce; the CEO has not been with Company long enough for many to express a distinct view.

• It is recommended that Aardvark Cement Products embarks on a deliberate strategy of mobilising the senior management team as a more visible part of safety leadership within the business at all levels.

  ▪ Senior managers make sure they spend a couple of hours each fortnight visibly in the operational work areas just “chatting” to workers about how things are going – and acting on any information they are given. It would be critical to ensure that such interaction was not seen as the manager “fishing”; if that were the case credibility would be lost.

  ▪ This program is the most powerful mechanism to begin to fracture disconnects that can occur, and have been shown to be present, within Aardvark Cement Products senior management and its operational workforce.

  ▪ Programs such as this attach aspects of “The Carer”, and “The Motivator” to people who are often thought to be “unreachable”.
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1 INTRODUCTION

Safety is known by the ABSENCE of events, which makes it a difficult challenge to achieve. We know that essentially all major safety events have their roots deep into the past practices of the organisations involved, and grow out of long causal chains involving the way that people work. In most cases the pre-cursors of events were there to see, but the organisations themselves were not able to recognise them.

Safety requires people to adopt a set of habits, and ways of thinking, that are often difficult and unnatural (e.g. reporting one's own mistakes, stopping a job in the middle of the process, etc.). As such, building a strong safety culture is a specific challenge of leadership. Safety never sleeps, and organisations cannot achieve exceptional performance without a deep-rooted set of beliefs, practices and behaviours that guide people’s decisions and action at all times.

We believe that the culture of an organisation embraces everything it does. It includes the policies, procedures and standards. It includes the housekeeping, the procedures and tools. A strong culture is one that is widely shared and based on a common and well-understood identity. A weak culture is diverse and differs from area to area within the organisation. It is important to recognise that a strong culture is not necessarily an effective culture (i.e. it may not achieve the required results), and it will also be resistant to change. For an explanation of some of the factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of safety culture refer to “The Structure of Culture” at Attachment 12.2.

Optimal safety cultures typically provide the necessary support for employees to strive beyond minimal efforts. Organisations relying on conventional safety and leadership approaches often fail to inspire the necessary safety-related behaviours and attitudes in their employees. In addition, these organisations have difficulty identifying, then removing barriers to safety excellence. Although most individuals possess the necessary values and intentions, their actual behaviours may not support an effective safety culture (these suboptimal behaviours may well be both overtly and covertly reinforced by the prevailing culture around them). TransformationalSafety.Com sees its mission as one of assisting Aardvark Cement Products gain an understanding and appreciation of its own unique safety culture, along with providing proven insights toward strategies which enable employees to close the gap between their values, intentions, and actual safety behaviours.

Since its inception, the concept of “safety culture” has been a key topic in discussions of safety across many industries. There is “a general recognition that while the importance of engineered safeguards and formal management systems to control risks is essential, it is equally important to win the commitment of the workforce to treat safety as a priority through a genuine corporate commitment to achieve high levels of safety”.

The concept of "safety culture" has largely developed since the OECD Nuclear Agency observed that the errors and violations of operating procedures occurring prior to the Chernobyl disaster were evidence of a poor safety culture at the plant and within the former Soviet nuclear industry in general. Safety culture has been defined as “that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organisations and individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding priority, plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance”. Safety culture is important because it forms the context within which individual safety attitudes develop and persist and safety behaviours are promoted. It is interesting to note

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that the concept of safety culture developed in response to major organisational accidents; however, it is now being more widely applied to explain accidents at the individual level. Safety climate is regarded as a manifestation of safety culture in the behaviour and expressed attitude of employees. The number of dimensions of safety climate remains disputed, although recurring themes across safety climate surveys include management commitment, supervisor competence, priority of safety over production, and time pressure. Elements of safety climate emerge as predictors of unsafe behaviour or accidents in numerous structural models and non-linear models, and it is increasingly becoming accepted that a favourable safety climate is essential for safe operation. Safety culture has been described as the “powerhouse” or “engine” that acts as the primary driver which powers the operational systems, and acts as the “resistance barrier” within the accident causation sequence. It has further been suggested that the most dangerous belief to have is one which equates to “we’re OK, because we have no real information saying otherwise”. The recent tragedies at the BP Refinery at Texas City (USA) were found to have occurred after a fairly consistent “run” of quite acceptable traditional safety metrics. One of the key commentators upon safety performance over the past two (2) decades has been Professor James Reason. Reason has been noted to remark that the best way to remain cautious in regard to workplace safety systems is to “gather the right kind of information otherwise”. This is not the traditional lag indicators, such as MTIFR, LTIFR, etc (remember Texas City had those); it is about the factors that have been identified to contribute to positive, proactive transformational safety cultures.

Lisa Ronald in her excellent literature review of factors contributing to successful safety programs concluded that the following dimensions were recognisable predictors of improved safety outcomes:

- People Oriented Culture
- Active Safety Leadership/Management Commitment
- Joint Health and Safety Committee Activities
- Safety Diligence
- Safety Training and Motivational Programs
- Disability (injury) Management and Health Promotion
- Workplace and Workforce Demographics

Specifically Ronald makes the observation, “active safety leadership/ management commitment variables appear to play an integral (if not the most crucial) role in ensuring safety success”.

The 1982 Report by the US Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety\textsuperscript{20} outlines why management commitment may be so essential to safety program success. Specifically, it states that while legislation has contributed to improved safety performance, compliance will not by itself produce an outstanding safety record.

“The initiative to achieve and maintain excellent safety must come from management..., they alone have the authority within their companies to establish the policies and priorities and to communicate them throughout their organisations...... they alone have the authority to implement safety programs, commit resources, and reward their managers and employees for achieving the goals of those programs. The goals may not be attainable without the cooperation of employees, but only management has the authority to request of its employees the actions needed to realise those goals.”

Additionally, the authors state that

"commitment provides a sense of purpose, identity and direction to those responsible for managing a company... [which] must be highly visible and effectively communicated to all ranks of workers. It must be genuine and backed by the highest levels of company management, including the chief executive officer and the board of directors or owner.” But importantly, the authors state, “it must be accompanied by actions that convince everyone in the company of the sincerity of the commitment, [since] commitment can create only an illusion of accomplishment unless it results in action.” (Committee on Underground Coal Mine Safety, 1982)

Research has focused on supervisors as role models for instilling safety awareness and supporting safe behaviour\textsuperscript{21,22}. Involvement of the workforce in safety decision-making has also received attention\textsuperscript{23}. Both of these concepts naturally lead to a consideration of the safety philosophy of upper management and the safety management system of the organisation.

Hofmann and others\textsuperscript{24} label the individual attitudes and behaviours discernible in safety climate as the micro-elements of an organisation, which themselves are determined by macro-elements of the safety management system and practices. In this sense management attitudes and behaviour are critical components toward safety; permeating down through the organisation to the workforce.

Burman and Evans, in discussing developments within the Bristow Group, have also made a strong argument that “management” and “leadership” are fundamentally different when it comes to safety. By making the commitment that optimising their “safety culture”, is something which is independent of any traditional safety management system (SMS) - notwithstanding the SMS is important and often a legislative requirement – they have identified “leadership as the secret ingredient to build a strong culture of safety”\textsuperscript{25}.


More recently Barling\textsuperscript{26} and Broadbent\textsuperscript{27} both explore the impacts that specific management systems and approaches to leadership can have upon safety outcomes in measurable terms and have drawn some powerful conclusions that are increasingly being recognised and implemented internationally.

2 PURPOSE

This report describes the results of an assessment of the safety culture and safety leadership at Aardvark Cement Products. The primary objective of the report is to provide information regarding the presence or absence of safety culture and safety leadership characteristics. Observations regarding the characteristics of Aardvark Cement Products’ safety culture that should be sustained are presented. Areas in need of management focus to improve the businesses safety culture are also presented.

3 BACKGROUND

Evaluating the safety culture of a particular organisation poses some challenges. Cultural assumptions, which influence behaviour and, therefore, safety performance, are not always clearly observable. Schein\textsuperscript{28} presents a model of culture that helps in understanding how the concept can be assessed. In Schein’s model, culture is assumed to be a pattern of shared basic assumptions, which are invented, discovered or developed by an organisation as it learns to cope with problems of survival and cohesiveness.

Three Levels of Culture (Schein)

According to Schein’s three-level model, an organisation’s safety culture can be assessed by evaluating the organisation’s artefacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions. On the first level of the model are the organisation’s artefacts. Artefacts are the visible signs and behaviours of the organisation, such as its written mission, vision, and policy statements. The second level consists of the organisation’s claimed or espoused values. Artefacts are the visible signs and behaviours of the organisation, such as its written mission, vision, and policy statements. The second level is comprised of the basic assumptions of the individuals within the organisation. Basic assumptions are the beliefs and attitudes that individuals bring into the organisation or that are developed as a result of experience within the organisation. Examples of basic assumptions may include, “safety can always be improved” or “everyone can contribute to safety.” The organisation’s basic assumptions regarding safety culture are less tangible than the artefacts and claimed values. They are often taken for granted within the organisation that shares the culture. This is dangerous as we frequently assume the presence of these characteristics, and fail to recognise that they require reinforcement and nurturing.


Artefacts, claimed values, and basic assumptions are evaluated to identify the presence or absence of the characteristics that have been found to be important for the existence of a positive safety culture. These characteristics include:

- Safety is a clearly recognised value in the organisation.
- Accountability for safety in the organisation is clear.
- Safety is integrated into all activities in the organisation.
- A safety leadership process exists in the organisation.
- Safety culture is learning driven in the organisation.

Schien has indicated that “attitudes” have been identified to evaluate the extent to which the organisation is able to, or likely to be able to attain these objectives.

This methodology was originally developed with the support of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to assess the influence of organisation and management on safety performance.

The methodology entails collecting a variety of information that is largely based upon the perceptions of the individuals in an organisation. Perceptions are often reality when it comes to influencing behaviour and understanding basic assumptions. Therefore, the data collected regarding individuals’ perceptions are critical to this type of assessment. The TransformationalSafety® Culture and Leadership Survey was selected as a primary methodology as it is heavily grounded in entering into the perceptions of the respondents.

4 SCOPE OF SAFETY CULTURE ASSESSMENT

The scope of this safety culture assessment was defined to include all of the functional areas at Aardvark Cement Products. The author was on site at Aardvark Cement Products during January of 2012, to conduct the wireless survey administration. Focus group interventions at the Safetyville site were conducted during March/April 2012.

The Aardvark Cement Products Safety Culture and Leadership Assessment was conducted by Mr David G Broadbent (Safety Psychologist) from TransformationalSafety.Com. An abbreviated biography is presented at Section 11.

This Safety Culture Assessment is a “point in time” snapshot of Aardvark Cement Products.

5 METHODOLOGY

The methodology used in this assessment was primarily two-fold. The goal of utilising this methodology was to provide both quantitative and qualitative entry to the “inside” of the cultural dimensions operating within Aardvark Cement Products, as far as safety performance is concerned. The two methodologies used were the TransformationalSafety® Culture and Leadership Survey (quantitative data collection) and Focus Group Assessments (qualitative data collection). Both sets of data were discussed collectively, and individually, with the senior management team as a means of placing that particular lens of understanding over the observed data. The Observational Protocol was not associated with this Assessment.

A total of 660 individuals actually completed the Transformational Safety® Culture and Leadership Survey, which represents an 97+% response rate. This response rate is quite high and most acceptable for the purpose of drawing accurate conclusions regarding the perceptions of Aardvark Cement Products personnel.

To maximise the various views that can be taken of the Aardvark Cement Products Safety Culture responses TransformationalSafety.Com uses data slicing protocols.
The Primary Data Slices identified for this implementation were based upon:

- Department, and
- Employment Level

### Transformational Safety® Culture and Leadership Survey Response Breakdown by Data Slice

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The use of multiple methods to assess any organisational behaviour assures adequate depth and richness in the results obtained. In addition, confirming the results obtained through the use of one method with results obtained through the use of another method provides convergent validity for those results.

A brief description of each method is provided.

5.1 **The Transformational Safety® Culture Survey**

The primary purpose of administering the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey is to measure, in a quantitative and objective way, topics which have been shown to be powerfully correlated with quality safety performance. The safety culture factors that are assessed by the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey are:-

1. Communication
2. Personal Priority/Need for Safety
3. Supportive Environment
4. Priority of Safety
5. Competence
6. Personal Appreciation of Risk
7. Managing Change
8. Work Environment
9. Co-operation
10. Involvement
11. Safe Behaviours
12. Systems Compliance
13. Management Commitment
14. Shared Values
15. Management Style
16. Safety Rules
17. Accidents & Incidents
organisation can be accessed, and it is possible to gather information from a larger number of personnel than can be reached through interview and focus group processes alone. The anonymity associated with the wireless administration process also significantly increases the “reliability” of the data obtained.

5.2 The Transformational Safety® Leadership Survey

The primary purpose of administering the Transformational Safety® Leadership Survey is to measure, in a quantitative and objective way, specific safety leadership dimensions, which have been shown to be powerfully correlated with quality safety performance and the development and maintenance of robust safety cultures. The transformational safety® leadership dimensions that are assessed by the Transformational Safety® Leadership Survey are:

- The Invisible Man
  In the world of safety “invisibility” is not a leadership trait that we should be aspiring to. You can often identify invisible safety leaders by the sheer fact that you never seem to be able to find them around. We know from myriads of organisational research that this leadership trait provides a negative impact on the organisations safety culture. Organisations that demonstrate significant behaviours of avoidance such as that indicated by The Invisible Man contribute directly to dangerous workplaces.

- The Fireman
  What is it that a Fireman does. They sit in their fire-house doing whatever they do in there. It is only when there is a fire that you see the “rubber on the road”. It might be said that a fireman is for the most part “hard to find”; although they do pop-up when there is a safety incident that demands their attention. When things have settled down they disappear back to the fire-house. If you are seeing some similarities here with The Invisible Man you are right on the money. Like The Invisible Man it can be shown that organisations full of Fireman are likely to be defined as “at risk”. We want to see minimal fireman-like safety leadership behaviours within an organisation.

- The Policeman
  What is it that a Policeman does. Their primary attention is on looking for breaches of the law etc. In the Transformational Safety® Leadership System “policeman” are about ensuring that we are following regulations, SOP’s, work instructions etc. When you look at the Policeman Leader-Plex slice you shall notice something a little different. We actually do want police-like leadership behaviours demonstrated by our safety leaders although we need to be careful we are not doing it “too much”. In strongly autocratic police like cultures we find people complying with SOP’s etc only when they feel “watched”. Too much “policing” also destroys initiative and thinking within the minds of staff; something which we actually want to encourage in the safest of cultures.

- The Dealer
  “Dealing” is arguably the fundamental basis upon which most of our organisations are based. It explores aspects of safety leadership behaviours that are consistent literally with doing deals. That may seem a little abstract yet we do this all the time. Consider that most of us go to work and expect to be paid for what we do. In other words we have a fundamental relationship with our employer that is based on “doing a deal” from the very beginning. Within some safety systems there are aspects of “reward”; eg the safety points systems, the safety “bingo’s” etc. and they have been shown to have some efficacy. Dealing within a safety culture works; probably because it is something which we fundamentally understand. As indicated we do it all the time, both at work and at home.
Like policing though we can do it too much. If something is about getting something back, particularly material, for anything we do we become very mercenary in our approach. We also create cultures that are strongly demarcated; which, in itself, can create large safety holes within the safety system.

**The Knight**

What is it that Knight’s have been known for, particularly in medieval times. Hopefully you are thinking about a person who is highly ethical and practices what they preach, lead’s by example, and “walks the talk”. To some degree Knights might also stand out from the crowd (though not always). The Knight is the first of the transformational safety leadership constructs. You will note the Best Practice Zones have shifted. We actually cannot experience too much transformational safety leadership behaviours within our work experience. Ideally we wish to see a consistent demonstration of transformational safety leadership behaviours peppered through the culture of the organisation.

**The Carer**

This TransformationalSafety construct pretty much speaks for itself. Cultures demonstrating the very important “caring” behaviours show people who actually know each other beyond the superficial “masks” that many of us initially wear at work. Caring safety leadership is further indicated by safety leaders who are genuinely interested and concerned about the contributions of their followers. Caring TransformationalSafety leaders go out of their way to treat the followers as individuals. There is definitely no “pack” mentality in the minds of these leaders. The “caring” leader is trusted by their followers. People within the business no they can approach people within this culture without fear of retribution. They know that outcomes shall be fair and equitable. The Carer construct should not be misinterpreted as being “soft”. It is about being considerate and concerned for the individual safety needs of followers.

**The Innovator**

Innovation is about thinking. It is about actively promoting and encouraging a culture of learning at both the individual and group level. Safety Leaders who demonstrate an innovative style are regularly challenging their followers to develop solutions to safety issues themselves or in partnership with their colleagues. It is NOT about telling how things “should” or “must” be done. The Innovator demonstrates trust in the intellectual development of their people. Whilst it is tempting to “save time” by just telling people how to do it; there is a lot more to be gained by encouraging people toward independent and supported learning. In the safety world continuous improvement is gained by having a transformational balance of innovation within safety development.

**The Motivator**

The Motivator is exactly as it sounds. It is about safety leadership behaviours that are dynamic in motivating followers toward improved safety performance. Leaders who demonstrate behaviours consistent with The Motivator are powerfully positive about the safety journey and are inspirational in their approach to safety. They often mix their “motivational” behaviours with those attached to “innovation”. Such organisations often find their safety systems respond exothermically to such behaviours.
The Missionary

The Missionary is all about let’s get this done together. Heavily team focussed in their approach they advocate a great deal of confidence that the safety goals of the business are achievable. They demonstrate a strong sense of “mission”, and are sometimes thought of as being a bit charismatic or “over the top”. This sense of zealouness is often understood and “forgiven” as followers certainly can see the sense of genuine concern for safe outcomes that The Missionary demonstrates. There is a strong requirement for consistency with Missionaries. It is very difficult to “fake” these behaviours as cultures are generally extremely adapt at identifying any Machiavellian missionaries within their midst.

Focus Group Evaluative Protocol

The main purpose of the focus group is to draw upon participant’s attitudes, feelings, beliefs, experiences and reactions in a way in which would not be feasible using other methods, for example observation, one-to-one interviewing, etc. These attitudes, feelings and beliefs may be partially independent of a group or its social setting, but are more likely to be revealed via the social gathering and the interaction which being in a focus group entails.

Compared to individual interviews, which aim to obtain individual attitudes, beliefs and feelings, focus groups elicit a multiplicity of views and emotional processes within a group context. The individual interview is easier to control than a focus group in which participants may take the initiative. Compared to observation, a focus group enables the gaining of a larger amount of information in a shorter period of time. Observational methods tend to depend on waiting for things to happen. In the focus group we describe scenarios and encourage comment and belief about those scenarios.

Kitsinger argues that interaction is the crucial feature of focus groups because the interaction between participants highlights their view of the world, the language they use about an issue and their values and beliefs about a situation. Interaction also enables participants to ask questions of each other, as well as to re-evaluate and reconsider their own understandings of their specific experiences.

Another benefit is that focus groups elicit information in a way which allows researchers to find out why an issue is salient, as well as what is salient about it. As a result, the gap between what people say, and what they do, can be better understood. If multiple understandings and meanings are revealed by participants, multiple explanations of their behaviour and attitudes will be more readily articulated.

6 ANALYSES

6.1 The Transformational Safety® Culture Survey

The analyses presented below summarise the insights gained from the analyses of the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey responses, coupled with Focus Group feedback, 1:1 informal interviews, and random observation. Analyses are presented in such a way that they approach the outcomes by exploring some fundamental safety focussed questions (or themes) that can be drawn from the Transformational Safety® Culture graphical representations and converged with Focus Group feedback (For information on how to understand the Transformational Safety® Culture graphical representations see Attachment 12.3).

6.1.1. Aardvark Cement Products Safety-Plex Representations:

All Data Slices Combined.
Data Sliced by Department

Data Sliced by Employment Level
What does communication look like at Aardvark Cement Products?

Safety Communication continues to be recognised as a core predictor within the cultural journey of any business. An organisation may have all the correct policies, procedures etc. It may have the appropriate corporate values, with safety being a core value. All that being said, if the workforce does not recognise these “values” via the internal communication structures, the effectiveness of the overall safety plan is being compromised. The items within the Communication element of the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey aim to provide a balanced appreciation of the workforces’ acknowledgement of the quality of the safety communication within the workplace.

Aardvark Cement Products’s response profile shows an organisation that has a range of communications that the workforce generally recognises as “working”. To a large degree it is acknowledged that when it comes to safety, there is pretty much an “open door” policy and that safety communication is reasonable. There was a significant level of uncertainty about these factors; although the level of complete disagreement was relatively small.

The level of “praise” or “recognition” for safe work practices is felt to be quite low, with half the workforce suggesting they do not receive any real recognition.

It was also felt by many employees, that supervisors did not always inform them about what was going on around the organisation.

When we explore the data slicing we find that Employees/Non Supervision and First Line Supervisors are in agreement with respect of praise/ recognition. Almost 50% report a clear lack of praise; when you factor in the “undecided” the observation becomes more powerful.

Within traditional behavioural research we know, with some certainty, that positive reinforcement (which may take the form of praise) has far greater long term impact than the alternative. As we move higher up the organisational tree there is less certainty. It is interesting to observe that almost all employment levels “disagree” to the same proportions. The evident difference is the view expressed by the Senior Management which is almost of an opposing view to the general workforce. Senior management appear to recognise the value of “praise”, and report actually being in receipt of some, although this would not appear to be titrating down to other levels within the organisation. This is a significant observation.

If we take a look at the same item from a different perspective, i.e. specific work areas within Aardvark Cement Products, we can see that the identified trend somewhat continues. The operational employees show that half their number do not feel they receive any real recognition for working safely. This result is reflected also by administrative staff. The key difference is the level of uncertainty demonstrated. Almost one third of operational staff, on the other hand, do report feeling a degree of praise for working safely, whilst approximately half of administrative staff feel there is some valid recognition. This shows that there is a clear distinctions between views amongst administrative staff; with very little uncertainty of opinion. Having made that observation, there are clear indications that the question of
“praise”, and more generally recognition, is demanding of greater consideration and this thesis shall be further explored.

When we come back to the important area of communication around safety matters we find a consistent result between work locations that is demanding of comment. We find almost universal agreement that there is good communication within the workplace. What is worthy of note here is the generally very low level of uncertainty across all work locations. In addition the meagre level of disagreement, particularly coming from operational staff, with regard to this question if of some merit. The only minor deviation is coming from the Interstate Operations. Given the decentralised nature of this classification the result is not unexpected, and is still considered very positive in nature.

Other items within the Communication realm would appear to point to a partial breakdown in communication, particularly within the operational areas. Approximately fifty percent (50%) of operational employees report that their line manager/supervisor does not always inform them of current concerns and issues. This is a significant result, although is tempered somewhat by the almost forty percent (40%) who feel that this communication is happening. Due to the small sample size it was not possible statistically to drill down any further into this result. It shall be investigated further within the Focus Group protocol.

When we specifically ask about “safety matters”, the result is comparatively more positive across all work areas. It needs to be said though, that there was an unacceptable level of “uncertainty” coming from within the Administration and Sales & Marketing classifications (approaching 50%). What this means is that when asked if safety information is always communicated, half of these groups actually do not express an opinion either way. It might be argued that these groups are not at the “pointy end” of production. That may well be accurate, although it remains important to ensure that “safety communication” is positively experienced within all levels of the business.

Focus Group Feedback

Focus groups gave a picture of vertical communication structures that resulted in a feeling of information overload. A significant number of participants acknowledged that they had been known to delete email safety information without bothering to read its contents. A significant number questioned what they believed were “broadcast” messages from across the Globe; which were felt to bear little relevance to local circumstances. The Senior Leadership Focus Group clarified that only DANGER correspondence was generally broadcast internally within Australia. Information of that magnitude is most definitely warranted.
Do Aardvark Cement Products employees have safety as one of their personal priorities?

Aardvark Cement Products employees certainly do have safety as a personal priority, although there is some evident variance dependent on where you work within the organisation. Put more simply, if you are an operational employee then you appear to have a significantly higher priority, than if you were an administrative employee.

This leads to an important observation in that administrative support may well be seeing “safety” as more the purview of operational employees. With the consistent message being expressed by Aardvark Cement Products, that safety is a key priority for the organisation this does not appear to be universally incorporated into personal thinking. This observation requires further thought. Often it may be administratively based employees, working within higher echelons of a business who are involved in decision making processes that directly impact the operational employees, who see themselves as “on the tools”.

In contrast, operational employees, as do supervisors, very strongly are saying that they have a high need for safety as a personal priority. These groups generally are operating in areas with a greater risk profile, so the gap between their behaviours and an accident outcome is far smaller than within the majority of administrative environments. It needs to be acknowledged that operational and laboratory staff actually can be “seen in the green” on this dimension.

When we consider the specifics around Item 35 though, we see a slightly different view. There is almost one third (29%) of Employees/Non Supervision who agree that “safety” is not the most important aspect of their job. We also see a similar percentage of Senior Management staff reporting uncertainty with regard to this question.

Once we see this result, it demands that we take a more inquisitive view across work locations within the business. Here we see that this result has been significantly impacted by the result presented by those within the Administrative and Sales & Marketing classifications. Again this is not what we are aiming toward. The operational employees have about twenty percent (20%) of their number stating that safety is not the most important aspect of their job. Think of this as one in five. Still worthy of further effort as this group does have a higher risk profile within the business.

Focus Group Feedback

Focus groups were quite divided when exploring issues surrounding personal priorities. Administration based staff stated that whilst they might feel it is a valuable priority, they do not believe it is seen as being highly relevant to their work area. They expressed the view that some people had suggested words to the effect of this “safety stuff is not for us”. Administration based staff openly indicated though, that safety was not at the forefront of their mind when completing tasks. During focus groups almost no staff stated they ever gave much though at all to keyboard usage or workstation design. Conversely, operational based focus groups stated that they considered safety as being amongst their highest priorities. They also said there was both an overt and covert pressure to get the job done quickly and this meant having to turn a “blind eye” to safety, on occasion. The example was offered, by
different focus groups, of where a product was being completed at the same time that the delivery truck was waiting to be loaded. Operational focus groups almost unanimously stated that the perceived focus on production outputs resulted in the prioritisation of safety being compromised. They stated that they felt the have “never been busier”.

It would be fair to say that all focus groups acknowledged a need for personal safety.

Is there a safety specific supportive environment in place at Aardvark Cement Products?

For safety to be maintained as a behavioural value within an organisation it needs to exist within an environment that is supportive and able to tolerate system failures in a proactive developmental manner. Response profiles suggest that Aardvark Cement Products provides a supportive environment to its workforce when it comes to safety. It is powerfully acknowledged that employees are encouraged to report unsafe conditions. Responses place the organisation toward the upper end of the Amber Zone. When asked a similar question, with an inserted negative, we see an equally impressive result. When asked if employees are not encouraged to raise safety concerns, we see almost unanimous disagreement. This is as it should be!

When we consider individual employees thoughts, with regard to their personal input into influencing health and safety performance, the response profiles are quite positive. Approximately one quarter (22%) of operational employees feel they are not in a position to be of much influence. Whilst the business needs to focus on reducing that belief; it also needs to be acknowledged that a little over two thirds (69%) of operational employees feel they can exert some influence – and that is a good thing. Similarly we see one quarter (25%) of operational employees stating that they feel it is none of their business if people ignore “safety procedures”. If we accept the premise that operational employees are at a somewhat higher risk, then this “view” is deserving of some further attention.

An important aspect of demonstrating a safety-supportive environment can also be measured by looking at the how the business is seen to respond behaviourally to a safety incident. Specifically if we look at the issue of “blame” and whether employees feel there is an underlying blame culture operating underneath the operation. When we consider this question from the perspective of Work Area we find that employee response profiles, consistently suggest that there is a no-blame culture operating within these areas.

If we look at this data from the perspective of employment level within the business, though we do see that almost one quarter (23%) of participants, who function at the Employee/Non Supervision level, report “blame” being an issue for them. What this suggests, is that when we view the data through the lens of Work Area we see the more positive views of First Line Supervisor and Senior Leadership influencing the result in the more positive direction. This view suggests there is value in ensuring that every effort is put into ensuring that people do not “experience” any investigations etc as being singularly focussed – the focus should always be aimed at the process. People being people, this can be a genuine challenge to achieve.

Focus Group Feedback
Focus groups reported a supportive environment generally. Staff feel they certainly support each other. They often stated that this was not always felt to be the case with regards to senior management. There were some exceptions here and it was not uncommon to hear focus groups naming areas where they felt there was greater support available - specific mention was made within the Maintenance Area with this regard. This was put down to individual differences between work area supervisors.

There were strong opinions expressed which indicated that almost all people feel that if they have a safety issue that they feel needs to be raised, then they would be given a “fair hearing”. This view was consistently expressed across all work areas and employment levels. It is to be commended. There was certainly some debate though, as to whether there would be action/s emanating from those discussions.

What do employees think about the priority of Safety at Aardvark Cement Products?

Priority of Safety is related to, yet different from, the similar dimension of Personal Priority/Need for Safety. The primary difference here is almost self evident. The former is more closely aligned with the personal values of individual employees, whilst the latter is the observation of these same employees toward the more global appreciation of corporate priority. It must be said that we really want to regularly see this element approaching the Green. If it is not, then we have the potential for a significant disconnect between what many organisations verbally promote and the actual experience of the workforce. Failure of organisations to demonstrate their priority of safety in such a way that it is actually experienced by their workforce is a significant contributor to unsafe behavioural outcomes.

Priority of Safety is shown to be toward the upper end of the Amber Zone.

It is worth revisiting, at this point, what the Amber Zone represents. Results that appear in the Amber Zone are areas that would gain from focussed attention. This is the Zone that many organisations would find “comfortable”. TransformationalSafety.Com sees the Amber Zone much like, what has been elsewhere described as, “No Mans Land“. It is not in the realm of Best Practice, nor is it in the “Dead Zone”.

When we look at some of the items that make up the Priority of Safety factor, we see some interesting profiles represented. When it comes to the question of whether or not safety rules and procedures are carefully followed we find the bulk of Employees/Non Supervision personnel indicating that rules and procedures are, for the most part, carefully followed. Within the leadership team at Aardvark Cement Products there is a degree of uncertainty as to this result. This suggests a level of concern which could be interpreted in a number of ways. Firstly there is an issue around confidence with regard to the implementation of rules and procedures within the business. Also there may be a more direct concern that rules and procedures are not being followed with the degree of care and attention that it is felt are required. Further discussions around what is the more accurate interpretation would be of value.

The management team at Aardvark Cement Products
express a view toward Priority of Safety consistent with the rest of the workforce. The key items which contributed to this result are around the uncertainty surrounding procedural compliance, whilst their is some disagreement within the management team with regard to priority of safety, when compared with production.

When we explore priority of safety from the perspective of work area we find that over one quarter (28%) of employees within operational work areas are reporting that, in their view, safety issues are not assigned a high priority. All other work areas show a consistent and optimal profile.

If we apply the lens of employment level to this result we similarly see a significant number of employee/non-supervision respondents (20%) also expressing concern regarding the level of priority given to safety. Again, it is important to note here that the vast majority (69%) of employee/non-supervision actually do report that they consider safety is assigned a high priority. That is always to be commended, and should be.

There is a level of uncertainty (30%) within the interstate operations – again it is argued that this result should be tempered with an appreciation for their geographical isolation and subsequent removal from the day-to-day operations.

This particular item should always have a very low level of uncertainty within an optimal safety culture. It is not delving into behavioural identifiers; it is asking respondents to report on a more intrinsic premise to safety in the workplace.

Another factor associated with priority of safety is whether employees see an organisation having their own safety as a front of mind issue, i.e. safety of employees is of great importance. This is an item that leaves little ambiguity within the personal interpretation. Across all work locations and employment levels, with minimal exception, employees report that management considers safety of great importance. There may well be, and appears to be some questions around the application of the aspirational goal – nonetheless the recognition by the workforce of such presence is noteworthy.

Focus Group Feedback

Focus group feedback was generally quite consistent across all locations. There was consistent and loud acknowledgement that Aardvark Cement Products does have safety as a priority within the business. Even within those pockets of the business who may have been arguing from the perspective of “motive” did not question that Aardvark Cement Products promotes a safe workplace consistently. As suggested there was some debate around the motivation for “priority”; with a significant number ascribing such to a financial basis. Staff from the employee/non-supervision areas appeared more likely to question the “priority”, with comments suggesting that the priority may change dependant upon what’s going on. This too was noted by a number of mid-level staff as well.
What do employees think about competence at Aardvark Cement Products?

Not only is competence to perform one’s functions in the workplace critical; equally so is the corresponding level of confidence within the organisation's safety training systems. In other words employees need to be confident that the organisation provides sufficient training opportunities to not only develop the necessary competencies to perform their functions safely, these training opportunities also need to address their ongoing sustainability needs. The items within the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey seek to explore both the satisfaction with training, its link to safety confidence, and also general views about safety competence within the overall workforce.

For the most part employees across the business have some confidence in the competence of their colleagues. There are some concerns within the views of Operations and the Laboratory – although these are not significant when matched with the low level of attached uncertainty.

Of greater concern is the percentage of Senior Managers (29%) who report that there may be an issue with competence, when it comes to the general workforce.

When we look into the associated question of safety training we find that across employment level, and work location, there is quite high agreement that the safety training provided by Aardvark Cement Products contributes to a sense that respondents are better able to approach their work tasks safely. Once we drill down a little further we see some relevant factors emerging. Middle and Senior managers provide a profile suggesting some “concerns” about the quality of safety training. This is further explored within the Focus Group Feedback.

Focus Group Feedback

Focus groups conveyed a consistent message here with general agreement that the majority of staff are competent in performing their work tasks. They were a little more spirited in their approach to the question of safety training. Many offered observation “What training?” Operational employees felt that training was almost non-existent. All operational focus groups made the observation that there has been very little safety training the preceding eighteen (18) months. Administrative based focus groups mirrored their operational colleagues. There were some administrative focus group members who stated they had been involved in no safety training (other than their initial employee induction). During leadership focus groups the issue of internal training was acknowledged as an area wanting for improvement. Such was underway at the time of analysis.
Do Aardvark Cement Products employees have an appropriate personal appreciation of risk?

The understanding of risk is one of the most significant contributors to how we behave in various contexts. Risk assessment, management and competence are all key factors. To this end how employees appreciate the “risks” within their contextual workplace environments is of key importance. If one has no real appreciation of associated risks then one does not generally modify behaviour based upon particular exposures. This has long been understood within the motor vehicle accident arena with young people often identified as a group with low personal appreciation of risk; thus they attract a higher premium due to their cost history. We need to understand workplace behaviours in much the same way.

Understanding the personal appreciation of risk is a challenging exploration for many. It is no surprise that the world of risk is a large and complex one, with multiple models of risk being developed. In the workplace environment we would far prefer to err on the side of being risk averse than too risk tolerant. Therefore when analysing workplace responses to the risk based items within the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey we take this consistent approach.

An associated concept to personal appreciation of risk might be called “fatalism”. Those who essentially might have a view “what will be, will be” have been shown to be more likely to accept risky behaviours both personally, and amongst those around them. We find an extremely high frequency of fatalistic thinking within the operational areas of Aardvark Cement Products. Half (50%) of the operational workforce report a belief that at some point in time they are going to be involved in an accident. This result is demanding of attention. The only work area that demonstrates an optimal profile here are from within the administrative locations. With the view that administrative people often do not see their risk exposure as being all that high, we are seeing the “value” of that view showing itself when it comes to fatalism.

When we look at this same question from the perspective of employment level we find that half (50%) of First Line Supervision are undecided, with respect to the question. We again see a significant number of Employee/Non-Supervision respondents (42%) also reporting that they are going to be involved in an accident someday. The fact that there is such an “overlap” in role classification between the Operations Area and Employee/Non-Supervision respondents just serves to provide convergent validity on this observation. Focus needs to be places on reverting this “belief”

If we now also look at the related concept of “worry” about injury, we see some observations that further suggest there are significant pockets within the business who have ongoing concerns about the likelihood of an accident effecting them. Within the Laboratory we see seventy percent (71%) of employees suggesting they spend time worrying about being injured on the job. Of equal concern are the number of persons from within operational work areas who indicate a sense of worry about being hurt on the job. Again this profile matches prior observations more directly associated with fatalism,

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We can also see one hundred percent (100%) of administrative employees stating categorically that they very rarely consider being hurt on the job. This level of consistency further supports the discriminatory power of the item itself. We generally find that the higher the risk profile the greater the degree of fatalism.

The construct of “worry” is worth also considering from the perspective of employment level within the business. What we can see is that, on average, more than 1:5 (20%) of the workforce at Aardvark Cement Products spends at least sometime worrying about whether or not they may be injured on the job. Some groups significantly exceed that general observation. Note well, the result here of First Line Supervision and Employees/Non-Supervision. They are significantly elevated within the Red Zone.

When we widen the item itself, and ask a less personally focussed question, we still see a level of consistency with regard to perception of risk. One surprising observation comes form within the Sales/marketing team. Half of their number (50%) report feeling as though the risk of injury is quite high. We still see a significant number of laboratory personnel (43%) and operational personnel (31%) also reporting that the chances of being involved in an accident is quite large. Exploring this Item from the perspective of employment level we see almost one third (31%) of Employee/Non-Supervision employees also suggesting that the chances are quite high.

Having made these observations about fatalism, worry, and risk, the final lens is focussed upon what people feel about their own clarity as regards their personal responsibilities with reference to health and safety matters. At this point we see all employees of Aardvark Cement Products singing from the same song book – and in a very positive (optimal) direction. Almost without exception Aardvark Cement Products employees report feeling that they are clear about what their own responsibilities are. Even with that powerfully demonstrated “clarity of knowledge” the preceding observations remain intact. Whilst people report “confidence” in their own knowledge, they concurrently report concerns about “risk” from a number of different angles.

**Focus Group Feedback**

The focus groups comments about personal exposure to risk match closely with the graphical representations. Consistent comments from within administration groups was that they did not perceive much risk therefore it did not need to take much thinking time. Since they do not feel “at risk” they generally ignore the question. With a lower risk profile the consequences of this thinking are generally less severe than a similar view within a more operational role. Certainly operational groups were more cognisant of risk; although there was clearly an underlying sense of fatalism amongst their comments.
How well do employees feel change is managed at Aardvark Cement Products?

Change in the workplace is a true challenge for so many organisations. Yet, so often relationships have been found between poorly managed change and negative health and safety outcomes. Whilst much of the research in this area has been more directly associated with mental health outcomes it is important to recognise that employees who are not operating optimally present an increased risk irrespective of the type of task within which they are engaged.

If we consider the dimensions of the Process Safety Model, we find that Change Manage remains one of the key elements within. The effective management of change remains a core safety objective, and continuing challenge, within all best practice organisations.

Within Aardvark Cement Products the management of change is consistently reported, across all data slices, to be of some real concern. The vast bulk of employees either place Managing Change in the Red Zone, or very close to it.

Whilst the management team has a tendency to report positively they too are only just in the Amber on this one. It needs to be acknowledged that Aardvark Cement Products has recently undergone a significant change in the form of a change of ownership. Long term employees, without exception, report this transition as being the most aggressive in their corporate memory.

If we look closer at items here though we find a traditional pattern of senior management reporting some involvement in decisions effecting their work areas. Although there is only a little less than half (43%) of the senior leadership team indicating an involvement with regard to changes in the areas that they are responsible for. Within senior leadership teams, this is again one of those items where we really prefer to see a very consistent and cohesive result profile.

Whilst the above observation is of some concern, the picture displayed by First Line Supervision and Employees/Non-Supervision should be more so. The significant bulk of people at these levels within the business report that they are rarely consulted about changes occurring within their workplace. We know that failure to consult (or even pretending to consult) are some of the most crucial predictors of poorly performing safety cultures. When we then look at the same question from the perspective of work area we see some further concerns. Administration (67%), Operations (66%), and Laboratory (43%) personnel all have significant numbers stating that they are rarely consulted. The key language in this item is “within my work area”. The strength of this result suggest that it is more than just a “perception”, and strategies should be considered, as a matter of priority, to address this issue.

When we ask about the rate of change the response is even stronger. Given the recent journey of Aardvark Cement Products this result is not unexpected. Both the Administrative and Operational work areas report the rate of change being so significant that they find it difficult to “keep up”; 78% and 69% respectively. Almost one third of the senior leadership team (29%) agree that the rate of change has been far from optimal. Aardvark Cement Products has been an organisation that has had a stable leadership for many years. At the same time that the business experienced a new interventionist ownership, there was also a
change in the Chief Executive Officer - the timing of these transitions would have had a very powerful impact upon the workforce, and this is likely demonstrated within these results.

We do see some improvement though when we look at the communication of change with regard to local working procedures. A significant majority of employees acknowledge that they feel they are appropriately kept “up to speed”.

When we break this result down to look through the lens of employment level it is not quite so positive from the perspective of Employees/Non-Supervision. All in all though, a pretty good result here, given prior observations.

The stand-out item in any analysis of change management is the item which goes direct to the nub of the matter; “We often don’t know that things have changed around here until after its happened”. What this item achieves is an integration of the overall “understanding” around involvement and integration of “change”, within the work lives of respondents. The observations around this particular item are confronting and consistent. There are significant numbers of employees, across all work areas and employment levels, who agree with this statement. Within the administrative classification the result is unprecedented, with a result approaching ninety percent (89%). Very clearly the administrative employees at Aardvark Cement Products are very disillusioned about the manner in which significant changes to their work area have been implemented. What is also worthy of note, is that there is not one (1) employee who has disagreed with this item - the remaining ten percent (10%) are just “undecided”. As can be seen, there is also over half (52%) of operational employees who also agree with the item. These are perceptions that one does not wish to see within their business, and significant efforts need to be employed to combat these views. Given the strength of these opinions it is highly unlikely that they can now be reversed – the damage has been done. Efforts need to be on openly acknowledging where things could have/should have been approached differently; and then ensuring that any future significant changes have a clear mandate toward inclusiveness.

When we do look at this particular item from the lens of employment level there is a more positive position expressed by the senior leadership team, than all other work areas. This is not an uncommon observation, across many organisations. Indeed, to some degree, it is to be expected. One would expect senior leadership teams to be co-operatively working together, with regard to internal change practices. What we see though, within Aardvark
Cement Products, is only about half of the team disagreeing with the statement (which is the preferred response); with a significant number remaining undecided. Yet again we would make the point about the small sample size here; nonetheless we would also make the point that we would expect to see a greater level of homogeneity within such a small senior leadership team.

One of the dilemmas here though, and a common complaint within organisations, is the people whom these ‘changes’ may have the greatest impact upon certainly feel, or at least a significant representation of them, that they have not been involved. This goes toward a concept called “control”. It can be more readily understood as how much a person feels they have control over the changes that might be going on both within, and external, to themselves.

Often change is as much about perception as it is about reality. It was past Telstra CEO (Australia) Frank Blunt who made the point that “change” was a dirty word and he refused to have it spoken of. He described the processes more as one of evolution. For many the word “change” results in autonomic “resistance”. There is an opportunity here for Aardvark Cement Products to explore strategies which give the workforce a greater feeling of involvement than that which they currently are experiencing, based upon their self-report data.

**Focus Group Feedback**

Focus groups were quite distinct in their comments about change throughout the organisation. They generally stated that they had little, if any, input and were essentially “told” how it would be. Long term employees spoke of being involved in many change processes over their careers with the Company. Without exception, they described the changes that had occurred within the business as being mostly autocratic in style. These employees pointed toward many long-term employees who had “left” since the changes had been implemented. Others were stating that they are “looking”, and acknowledging that they had never thought of “leaving” previously. These are very powerful comments and provide significant convergent validity to the equally powerful profiles generated from the quantitative data.

Focus groups placed the responsibility for this style of management clearly within the corporate side of the business. Most people acknowledged that their concerns were largely outside the control of local site management.

**What does the Work Environment feel like at Aardvark Cement Products?**

The environment in which we work has a very real impact upon our capacity to tolerate all sorts of workplace risk factors. The physical aspects of a workplace environment can have a direct impact on the productivity, health and safety, comfort, concentration, job satisfaction and morale of the people within it. These may be things such as time, tools, targets etc.

Aardvark Cement Products would appear to be confronting some real challenges when it comes to factors associated with work environment. A significant proportion of the operational workforce (47%) report feeling as though sometimes there is insufficient time allocated to jobs in order to get the operation completed safely. In contrast the other half of the same workgroup (44%) report the alternate response; with very few employees (9%) being undecided. Whilst one can be gratified that a large proportion of the workforce do not feel their personal safety is being compromised, sometimes, by excessive workloads; the fact that almost half report the opposite view need to be truly concerning. When people have this view they are far more likely to take “shortcuts” to get the job done. These can be both overt and covert shortcuts - the latter being a real “killer” in the workplace.
When we look at this item from the administrative perspective we again see some real concerns. Very few (11%) of the administrative staff actually disagree with the proposition. It is suggested that since the administrative employees at Aardvark Cement Products have consistently, throughout their profiles, shown a low perceptual relationship between their particular work tasks and safety risk, the profile here is more of an “opportunity” statement. What this means is that, the nature of the wording “allows” respondents to make a particular comment in regard to workload – still one to give some thought to.

One item where Aardvark Cement Products has demonstrated an exceptional result is within responses to what we designate as a “lighthouse” item. A lighthouse item is one which seems to synthesise a range of “thoughts and feelings” into a key response profile to a very specific question. The item in question asks respondents to compare the “safety” within Aardvark Cement Products to other workplaces that they have been behaviourally exposed to. It does need to be acknowledged that Aardvark Cement Products has quite a number of very long serving (10+ years) employees for whom this type of comparative item would be difficult to make. That being said the result remains extremely impressive. Note the extremely low level of disagreement from within all work locations at Aardvark Cement Products. There is some serious uncertainty shown within the Operations, Laboratory, and Administrative work locations. In all likelihood this is being drawn from the aforementioned group of long term employees. With regard to the administrative classification it is suspected that this is an “infection” from what is clearly a fairly unhappy group of people, in respect of how they feel they have been generally treated through the stages of change – described in more detail previously.

One observation that cannot go unnoticed is within the Senior Management responses to this item. A significant proportion (57%) of senior managers who took part in the survey process do not have an opinion either way on the question as to whether this “is a safer place to work than other companies”. Having said that the majority of the senior management team have been with Aardvark Cement Products for fifteen (15+) years. If there is this lack of homogeneity within the senior management team, that is likely to be seen to cascade to other levels within the business. Whilst the senior management team is a small sample size (n=7), it does show the highest proportional response of indecision here. Again, the point is reiterated that, within senior management teams we aim to see close to unanimous agreement (one way or the another) to item responses. Such would suggest a highly interactive, communicative and cohesive management team.

Just as the previous item is considered to be of the “lighthouse” variety, so too is the next one we intend to explore. The question of interest is what does the workplace believe when it come to the application of operational targets, and whether these targets have an impact/influence on safety application within the business.

Almost all senior managers (71% or 5/7) within Aardvark Cement Products report that they do not believe that operational targets cause any conflict with safety measures within the business. This is as it should be. The dilemma here is that the senior management team would appear to be isolated on this point. In contrast we see that there is an opposing
situation reported by First Line Supervision with the bulk of their number (67%) stating, quite categorically\(^35\), that they feel operational targets do cause conflict, more often than not.

When we look at this result through the lens offered by operational employees, we see some real cause for concern. The absolute majority of operational employees (72%) report that there is frequently a conflict between the operational targets they are required to work towards, and the safety measures in place. Given prior result profiles presented by this group it is a reasonable interpretation to apply that when confronted by this form of “conflict” a significant number of these employees err on the side of “getting the job done”. The validity of the response profile is supported by the results offered by the Sales & Marketing team. As a group who have limited direct involvement in the direct manufacturing process, we would not expect these people to have a similar opinion. As can be noted this group of respondents do not “agree”, with the statement at all. The Laboratory employees, whilst not an optimal profile, certainly show a trend in the optimal direction. All other work areas offer a flat-lined profile.

A related area, to that reported above, is concerned with an employees perception of their working conditions; and whether such conditions impede, or get in the way, of being able to work safely. The profile offered by operational employees is consistent with the views described previously. In this case exactly half of their number do feel conditions get in the way of working safely. The group is quite polarised though with the other half (44%) feeling that they do not. As is the case when making analyses of safety perception (which is the cognitive precursor to behavior), we are more concerned with being able to adapt the negative perceptions of the workforce toward an optimal underlying safety focused belief system. What this means is the business does need to focus attention on “turning” the views of operational employees away from this negative “belief”.

It should be acknowledged that administrative employees, whilst quite negative in other areas, have demonstrated an ability to discriminate when it comes to making judgements about work practices and impacts upon safety performance etc. Almost all administrative employees (78%) acknowledge that the nature of their working conditions rarely, if at all, has an impact upon safety measures. This is as it should be, given the nature of the work involved. It is still most refreshing to see. The Sales & Marketing team literally mirror the optimal profile presented by the administrative employees.

When we look at these results through the lens of employment level we see an ever so slightly more positive profile. The employee/non-supervision classification is showing a more positive picture. One should not be deceived by this, into a false sense of security. This apparent “improvement” is due to the combination of operational and administrative employees having their result profiles combined – administrative employees were far more positive in this regard.

The issue of employee “numbers” is one which also goes to the area of working environment. More specifically, does the workforce believe there are sufficient numbers of them to ensure a safe working environment. You do not want to see large numbers of a workforce

\(^{35}\) One third of their number give the “strongly agree” response to this item.
59. There are always enough people available to get the job done safely

![Graph showing percentage responses across different departments.

Operations: 59%
Laboratory: 10%
Sales & Marketing: 30%
Administration: 40%
Interstate Op's: 20%

Agreement
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagreement

59. There are always enough people available to get the job done safely

consistently believing that they are "understaffed". Where that is the case we often find significant numbers of these employees looking for opportunities to compensate for this "understaffing". Sadly the outcome is more commonly associated with procedural deviations – which may well contribute to some significant system failures.

At Aardvark Cement Products we see some profiles here that suggest that whilst the bulk of employees do feel there are enough employees available to get the job done safely, there remain some significant pockets of people who do not believe this to be the case. Almost one quarter (22%) of operational employees feel employee numbers are a concern. The majority (59%) though do not.

As can be seen here, the sales/marketing group offers a near perfect response profile. Again their work role though is of comparative low risk, when compared with operational employees within the manufacturing areas.

It can be noted that a significant number of administrative employees provide a negative response with regard to this dimension. This is likely a direct result of the manner in which this group of people have perceptually experienced changes within their work areas. That being said, an observation such as this, within an administrative work area may contribute to elevated stress/anxiety levels within these work areas.

The availability of tools of trade etc is a factor closely associated with work environment. Operational and laboratory employees both have significant numbers (53% & 57% respectively) who assert they cannot always access the most appropriate tools for the job. This is an important issue as employers are often stating that people should “use the right tool for the right job”. If they are unavailable then the disconnect between word and action becomes self evident. Again administrative employees show the ability to discriminate and report this is not in any way an issue for them.

Of concern is the disconnect observed between the senior management team and the operational workforce, with respect to factors around work environment. This is best viewed by reference to the relevant Safety-Plex©. Whilst, within the Australian industrial culture, a degree of disconnect between “management” and “labour” is to be expected; the significance displayed here should be of some concern.

**Focus Group Feedback**

Generally Work Environment did not fare very well at all. Within the operational areas employees consistently pointed to work tasks that they felt placed them, at risk. Specifically identified was an operation which had gone from being a task that used a bulk loading station, to one that required a significant amount of manual labour. Whist the reasoning for the change was reported to be understood, many operational employees reported being very unhappy at the delay in resolving the situation.

All focus groups, with the exception of the senior management group, strongly made the point that they felt there was overt pressure nearly all the time. Some members of operational focus groups made the point “we are making less, but working harder”. It is not the authors position to make any judgement as to the validity or otherwise of such a
statement. The issue is that it is believed to be true, and has been verbalised by a significant number.

Employee morale was reported by almost everyone within the business to be the lowest in organisational memory. There were a wide range of reasons given for these comments, and some of these have been identified previously. Morale can, and regularly does, have a very specific impact within workplace safety and the accident causation sequence. It is commonly not appropriately dealt with by organisations, due to what is perceived to be its somewhat abstract understandings. Further information on the impacts of poor organisational morale is provided within Attachment 12.6.

Is there a spirit of co-operation within Aardvark Cement Products?

Co-operation is about how people work together to achieve an outcome. This is not specific to safety, though is found to spill over into the workplace safety environment. The primary focus here is co-operation at a functional level. Organisations which demonstrate high levels of co-operation within its workforce are less likely to experience incidents that occur as result of demarcation and “hand-over’s”.

When we look at the question of personal co-operation we find that almost all employees at Aardvark Cement Products report that they are highly co-operative towards each other. For example when we look specifically at the action item around stopping what you are doing if a colleague needs assistance we find almost universal agreement throughout all levels of the organisation and locations throughout the organisation. If we factor in some allowance for the “Good Samaritan” response we are still confronted with a very impressive result. This result alone would place Aardvark Cement Products powerfully in the Green Zone for co-operation.

It is though, when we widen our exploration of workplace co-operation from the personal, to the more conceptual we strike some observations that bring us back to the Amber; only just though. There are some pockets of employees who remain “undecided” as to whether management works “hand in hand” to keep things safe. It is these levels of indecision that have brought the overall result back to Amber.

It is also noted that that there were almost one quarter (24%) of employees/non-supervision who felt that “co-operation” was not the key word at Aardvark Cement Products. When it came to considering more behaviourally focused items though, this view was weakened somewhat.

All in all, the reported levels of co-operation within Aardvark Cement Products are quite impressive, with a result very closely approaching the Green Zone.
Focus Group Feedback

Focus group feedback was consistent with the Survey result profiles. Staff across all work areas strongly asserted that at a worker level there are high levels of co-operation. There was also consistent and positive support of Aardvark Cement Products and its commitment to the safety journey, with some small pockets of disquiet evident. Focus groups drew attention to the “family” culture of Aardvark Cement Products, and stated that they believe this enhances the desire to assist each other. Almost all focus group participants, across different work areas, expressed concern that over time the “spirit of co-operation” would be damaged by what was reported as a “destruction” of what they understood to be the “Aardvark Cement Products Culture”.

What is the level of Involvement feel like within Aardvark Cement Products?

This factor is all about how involved the various levels of the workforce see themselves as being “involved” in the development and implementation of safety systems. This is a critical factor as it has been regularly demonstrated where employees are directly involved in the creation of an organisational system they are far more likely to experience some level of “ownership” of that system. The next step is that of behaviourally responding to such systems. It has also been demonstrated that safety systems are far more likely to achieve strong levels of compliance where the target group see themselves as having been involved in the development and implementation processes.

We continue to observe some solid performance within Aardvark Cement Products, with a clear majority of employees reporting good levels of involvement when it comes to the question of informing Aardvark Cement Products management about important safety matters.

Whist there is some indecisiveness displayed by the sales and marketing team this is of limited concern. It is likely this group, being some distance from the operational processes, do not perceive the “need”. The negligible level of disagreement is a powerfully positive observation here.

When we look at a similar item about “being involved with safety issues at work” we see a very similar positive level of involvement across all work levels and work areas within Aardvark Cement Products. Again this is a very powerful positive observation.

It is when we leave the question of “informing” or “reporting” and begin to widen the target to actual involvement in the performance review process we begin to see a slightly different picture. At this point we must make the point that this is not the about the level or depth of involvement in the safety review process. It is about employees having an underlying perception that their input is valued and that they are then able to see themselves as having a constructive role in the review of safety. This can be within a local work unit, right through to a role as a co-opted participant in a more targeted safety review team. Work units who allocate time to genuinely discuss how the safety journey is progressing within their
immediate circle of influence shall result in solid observations of involvement being expressed.

Within Aardvark Cement Products it would appear evident that whilst, on the whole, we see a positive profile being presented with a large proportion of operational employees (59%) reporting that they do feel involved in the “review” of safety processes within the business, we still also concurrently see a significant proportion reporting that they are “never” involved (25%). Exploration of strategies to more overtly “involve” all operational employees is worth considering. There is some significant indecision here across all work areas.

**Focus Group Feedback**

Focus groups actually reported good levels of involvement. The application of the Safety Improvement (SI) program was reported as increasing levels of involvement across the business. At the same time large numbers of employees across all work areas offered the view that the SI program has got “out of control” with a focus primarily upon producing “numbers”. All focus groups acknowledged that Aardvark Cement Products management actively encourages involvement.

**What about Safe Behaviours at Aardvark Cement Products?**

Safe behaviour is the goal of all safety aware organisations. It has become such a focus that “behaviour based safety” has become the fastest, and amongst the most widely implemented approaches to safety, in the history of safety interventions. Within this descriptor we are exploring the constructs that underpin safe workplace behaviour. In other words what is the proportion of people who have safety factors as a “front of mind” issue, and then will act on that safety aware thinking. Concurrently we are also looking at the question of “shortcutting” which is the most dangerous of “landmines” for any safety management system.

Once again when we look at a personal action item we find significant numbers of employees from across all the different demographics, stating categorically that if they see somebody doing something that they deem to be unsafe they will actually step up and say something to them. This is a pretty impressive observation and the challenge is to ensure that this lofty goal is supported by behavioural association. Once again if this was all there was to it, then Aardvark Cement Products finds itself well “in the Green”.

![Graph with data](image-url)
It is one thing to say that we shall intervene in a risky situation. It is another altogether to take that back a little into the antecedents of behavioural systems. One of those might be thought of as how often safety, and safety related concepts, become part of the natural fabric of communications within an organisation. Not withstanding earlier observations regarding the general disengagement of the majority of employees from within the administration, when we explore this level of involvement we see some disturbing information. Within Aardvark Cement Products over half the workforce do not speak to the issue of safe work practices amongst themselves. They are saying that they do not, or that they don’t have any real opinion. Unfortunately in the areas of higher risk eg operational roles etc this is really a potential issue. If we are not “talking” about it, we are rarely “thinking” about it, and it then moves on to be that we are also often not necessarily “doing” it.

The most concerning aspect of Safe Behaviours is the exploration of shortcutting within an organisation. When we look into many incident investigations it is not uncommon to find that some form of “shortcut” has had a contributory involvement somewhere. It is very easy to “jump the gun” and start to “blame” the person. This is frequently a serious error. People take shortcuts for all sorts of reasons, and often there are systemic factors contributing along with personal decision making. Why is it that some workplaces have far less of an issue with taking shortcuts than others. It is actually not a direct product of the individuals concerned. It is a product of the prevailing culture that has been allowed to percolate within the business. When it comes to the question of Shortcutting we find that fifty percent (50%) of First Line Supervision acknowledge this as being an issue. Not only that, the remaining half are in the undecided category – nobody has disagreed with the contention. This is, in and of itself, a significant issue as front line supervisors are in the closest position to monitor and assist in the development and modelling of more positive safety behaviours. Having made that observation we are also compelled to acknowledge that almost half of the operational employees (44%) make the same admission. There are a moderate number of undecided (16%) and the remainder (40%) feel that shortcuts are not being taken. However one may choose to look at this result, this must be of real concern. As has been mentioned previously, in terms of risk of impact events this is the group within Aardvark Cement Products where, it might be said that, “the rubber hits the road”. The majority of
workplace incidents/injuries would be emanating from within this classification. To see the very real consequences of shortcutting cultures see Attachment 12.5\textsuperscript{36}.

We really are compelled to explore this issue in some greater detail. It can be seen that shortcutting is reported to be a significant issue, mainly within Operations. The proportion of people acknowledging the taking of shortcutting is “scary”. Whilst not as significant overall the observation that the majority of Laboratory employees (71%) indicate that they do not have a position either way is also a little concerning. The Aardvark Cement Products laboratory operation is quite small, with the majority of workstations quite near to each other. One would expect there to be more definitive opinions being expressed.

What cannot, and should not, be overlooked though is the profile of senior management. The profile show that senior managers at Aardvark Cement Products do not believe that there is any shortcutting operating within the business. If we accept the positions being reported by other work areas then there are approaches to work tasks being undertaken within the workplace, that the senior management team has remained unaware of for some time.

**Focus Group Feedback**

Focus groups did not really feel that they spent much time at all talking about safety. All groups indicated they were too busy just trying to “get the job done”. Certainly most people felt they would stop someone doing something unsafe, and then there were also some people who said they had witnessed colleagues doing things in an unsafe manner – and did not say anything.

Focus groups were certainly a little inconsistent in their responses when it comes the area of Safe Behaviours. Some operational focus groups were quite vocal in their acknowledgement that shortcutting takes place. They even stated that they are deliberately taken when the “pressure’s on”. There was also a focus group that did not seem to feel that shortcutting is a major issue.

When asked whether the organisation would be aware of these behaviours it was suggested that they would have to be. No examples were able to be provided on this latter point. There was the suggestion that some work areas were more prone to shortcutting than others. It was argued than when the pressure is on to get the job done, you do what you have to.

What does compliance with safety systems look like at Aardvark Cement Products?

Workplaces have a range of systems which have been developed to assist with the goal of minimising safety system failures, and injury to employees and members of the public etc. For these systems to work effectively staff who are exposed to them need to be compliant with those systems. More recent accident causation models have found that compromises in the integrity of internal safety systems are a major contributor to system events. We should always be encouraging our workforces to maximise levels of compliance within safety systems.

Generally staff at Aardvark Cement Products “play by the rules” as they see them. The question of compliance though is more targeted than the more general comment just made. When we look at the safety specific compliance items we get a little more of a variable response profile. We find that a significant proportion of the senior management team believe that all people do not comply fully with the organisations safety systems. The vast majority of employees at all other levels within the business generally report compliance with

Another mechanical measure of systems compliance is the degree to which employees fulfil their obligation under PPE Policy. In this area Aardvark Cement Products is conforming some challenge within some work areas. We see a significant proportion of laboratory employees (57%) not expressing a view either way when it comes to the use of PPE within the workplace. Whilst none of their number agree that it is difficult to get people to use PPE, we would hope to see a more a more decisive view coming from a work area where PPE use can form a fundamental component of the work task being undertaken. We do see that one quarter (25%) of operational employees indicating that they feel it is actually difficult to get people to use PPE. This is the group within the workplace who actually have the greatest need. There are many operational tasks which have appropriate selection and use of PPE as a compulsory pre-requisite prior to the task being undertaken. Further education/training targeted at this work group would appear to be indicated.

Another way of looking at this data would be to say that, on average, well over half of the workforce supports the view that their colleagues comply with PPE policy. We must remain concerned about those pockets of people who do not though. Now whilst the level of “disagreement” is not all that high, we still see some significant levels of neutrally. This is too be expected from respondents who see themselves in lower risk environments, such as the administrative world. It is not to be expected within the higher operational risk environments. Another observation worth making here is the homogeneity of responses amongst the different work groups. Again when we exclude the laboratory indecision, we find all other groups provide very similar profiles. What this means is that the level of compliance is pretty consistent across all of the work areas within the organisation.

**Focus Group Feedback**

Focus group feedback was consistent and supported the views independently expressed within the wireless delivery of the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey. When asked people stated that PPE use was not really an issue. Within focus groups most people reported general compliance with PPE requirements.

People reported that the majority were compliant with the internal safety systems. It was again noted that there were times when things were “busy”, that people might deviate from some of these procedures.
What does Aardvark Cement Products think about the level of management commitment to safety?

International research for many years has argued that the single biggest predictor of a robust and healthy safety system is that of “management commitment”. Indeed Lisa Ronald in her excellent literature review of factors contributing to successful safety programs makes the observation, “active safety leadership/ management commitment variables appear to play an integral (if not the most crucial) role in ensuring safety success”. It is for this reason that the Transformational Safety Culture System uses seven (7) items to appropriately interrogate this very important safety culture factor.

There is some significant variance within response profiles within many of the items associated with management commitment. It is this variance which maintains Aardvark Cement Products’ performance here, squarely within the mid range of the Amber Zone. Some areas though do show good markers for management commitment within Aardvark Cement Products. For the most part Aardvark Cement Products employees recognise that management does take action when a safety concern is raised. The related issue concerning speed of response follows an almost identical trend pattern with very similar response markers. This is a positive outcome in that it shows action being taken, and being seen to be taken, which is a powerful indicator of commitment. There are some pockets of disagreement, though these remain quite small. There continues to be higher than desired levels of neutrality.

When we ask about whether there is management concern shown when safety procedures are not adhered to we find that from the perspective of employment level there is generally a positive view.

Another very important indicator toward getting a grasp on employees’ understandings and beliefs about the commitment of management toward safety, is how proactive or reactive that they experience their management to be. The item that drills into these underlying beliefs is concerned with the “triggers” for management action. Ideally you want your workforce to see a minimal relationship between actual accidents and management activity. We actually want people to disagree with the statement to the right. As we see increasing levels of agreement, we start worrying about the inevitable journey toward the Red Zone. What is evident here is that a little over one quarter (28%) of operational employees report this to be their experience. We do need to acknowledge that a little over half (56%) of the operational employees actually indicate the alternative – and that is good. The target here though needs to be much higher; approaching eight percent (80%).

What is important to note, within the above example, is that there is not one employee within Aardvark Cement Products, operational employees excluded, who have agreed that “management acts only after accidents”. That is an exceptionally positive observation – although we need to temper that excitement, a little, by higher than desired indecision.

so, well done. The evidence is clear though, there is a need to explore strategies to make the safety management process more “inclusive” at an operational level; with more positive proactive management involvement.

This sort of situation, to some degree, is often a consequence of context. In other words whilst this may actually not be what is happening in reality (there may be a bit happening “behind the scenes”), it is what is “experienced,” and perception is strongly coloured by experience; with consequent behaviours being impacted by both. Having acknowledged this, it still becomes a requisite goal for any workplace to do all that they can to modify this belief. There is little value gained in arguing about “truth”; after all this is often a relative construct. It is about working hard to modify the underlying beliefs on display here.

Another indication that points toward levels of management commitment is the application of corrective actions. This is another of those areas that falls within our “lighthouse” category. Specifically, does the workforce see management responding to safety incidents in a consistent manner. In this area we see consistently positive responses throughout the organisation. There is some minor indecision, though not what would be considered significant. Overall the Aardvark Cement Products workforce strongly supports the position that management always takes corrective actions when they become aware of safety issues – that is an excellent observation.

A closely related item points toward the speed at which management is seen to respond to safety issues. In other words we have seen that the vast bulk of employees feel that management does respond to safety issues by implementing corrective actions. The next step in that process is the rate of implementation of these corrective actions. Once again we are seeing that a significant proportion of Aardvark Cement Products employees feel that management generally does act quickly; again that is to be commended. Such management behaviours are visible and tangible evidence of an organisation that is committed to the ongoing health and safety of its business, and for the most part that is being recognised. We are still seeing though, small pockets of employees who do not feel this is the case; although they are generally in the minority.

Within the area of “interest” being shown towards personal safety, we see again a similarly positive profile, across the majority of work areas. The interstate operations show some real uncertainty (30%), although not one of their number suggests that there is nil interest displayed. That too, is a good result.

We should also consider “management commitment” from the perspective of the Lord Nelson response. To those students of history we are talking about Admiral Nelson’s action in disobeying the order from the flagship to disengage, by putting his eyeglass to his blind eye to read the message, only to go on to defeat the enemy. Within the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey we have an item going directly into this to this world; though we rarely win. It is

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25. In my workplace management turns a blind eye to safety issues

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<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Neither Agree nor Disagree</th>
<th>Disagreement</th>
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<tr>
<td>Operations</td>
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This shall be explored in greater detail during discussions around Safety Leadership competencies later within this document.
all about whether the workforce believes that management “turns a blind eye” when it comes to safety within the workplace. We find that when we explore this factor from the perspective of employment level Aardvark Cement Products management fares pretty well. An overwhelming majority of employees are suggesting that it is too strong a position to take as regards expressing management commitment as a “blind eye” approach. There is a small blip within employees/non-supervision (24%). This result is a little inconsistent with response profiles observed within similar, yet different, items. When we narrow this down to specific work location we see an increase in the negative response (34%). On the one hand, some (not the majority by the way) operational employees seem to be suggesting that management responds appropriately so safety matters, when they are identified/raised. At other times, there can be a tendency to turn that blind-eye. We interpret that to suggest that if issues have not been identified, then they may not be getting addressed; when they are identified, they are generally addressed. There is a level of responsibility here, on operational employees, to be sure that issues which they believe exist within their zones of control; have been elevated to a level where the management team is aware of their existence. It would appear to be that once this has been achieved, the issue/s are well resolved.

**Focus Group Feedback**

Their was almost unanimous agreement, across all focus groups, that Aardvark Cement Products had significantly increased the focus upon workplace safety over the last few years. It is generally reported though that safety attention by management is very reactive.

Many reported feeling that although the organisation says it is committed to safety, that this is more about “saying the right thing” and not about necessarily “doing”. The most visible example raised consistently, was concerned with the issues around a bulk loading station described previously. Another group gave an example around the issue of racking integrity – and suggested that a request to give a storeman a “warning” over long term damage to racking was an example of trying to “blame”. The point was made that this proposed action was attempting to allocate a measure of personal responsibility to a situation that had evolved over a number of years. These were just two examples given, of quite a number, that go to demonstrate what Schein calls “artefacts of culture”. It is true to say that all organisations can have situations occur that may not be good practice. The dilemma in safety is when we find a number of these occurring and employees begin to speak more about these than the “good things” concerning local management safety commitment. They then become a port of the overall myths upon which an organisation can become based. This is called the “myth of exception”.

Unfortunately it seems to be our nature to raise up the negative management behaviours into the realm of “organisational reality”, whilst the positive management behaviours tend to be minimised. The challenge here is to activate and encourage behaviours consistent with the very practical demonstration of management commitment to such an extent that there frequency far exceeds the alternative. It is only in this way that an organisation can begin to minimise the impact from the “myths of exception”.

**Is there a sense of “shared values” with regard to safety at Aardvark Cement Products?**

Shared values are all about their being a consistent value system being evidenced at the various levels within the working environment. These values are about safety and the systems that underpin its successful performance. In a general sense it is about a sense that the organisation itself values the OH&S Policy and that the workplace itself shares a similar commitment to that Policy. Values are often described as one of those misty indeterminate factors that you just can’t put your finger on. On the Transformational Safety® Iceberg 39 “Shared Values” exist under the surface. The

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39 To see the Transformational Safety Iceberg go to Attachment 12.6
stronger there is a belief, that all within the workplace share positive values, as regards safety, the more likely the business shall achieve sustained safety outcomes.

Within the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey we approach the question of shared values primarily from the “values” document which all companies are required to have by law; the Occupational Health and Safety Policy. It is the content of which, and how closely the workforce feels aligned with the goals and objectives of this Policy which goes some way to giving us a level of insight into these “values”. It is unfortunate that many organisations spend significant resources developing a “Values Statement”, then far less time ensuring it is “lived”.

We find that there is an evident disconnect between what the senior management team believes about the seriousness of employees attitudes toward the OH&S Policy and that of the workforce in general. Over one quarter (27%) of all employee/non-supervision respondents report that they do not feel the OH&S Policy is treated all that seriously. When we take a look at this data through the lens of work area we see a slightly higher (31%) figure pointing in the same direction. In contrast to these views the senior management team did not have one member who felt that the OH&S was not treated all that seriously by anyone.

Aardvark Cement Products employees believe strongly though that the organisation believes in the values expressed in the OH&S Policy. When we dig deeper to seek any anomalies we really do not find any. It does not matter whether we look from the perceptive of employment level, work location, age range, length of service, or gender breakdown, the trend of powerful positive agreement is consistent. If we consider the prior comments we observe a situation where everyone within Aardvark Cement Products acknowledges the Companies commitment to the “values” expressed within its OH&S Policy; the issue is around the “transference” of those values within the organisational populace.

Coming back to a more global perspective which draws upon individual beliefs we find yet a different picture outlined. When employee’s are actually asked if people should “all pull together” when it comes to workplace safety there is little disagreement; although there is a moderate level of uncertainty (20%). Again if we delve deeper into all the different data slices we find the belief is quite consistent. The observation which does stand out here is that demonstrated by the senior management team.
Focus Group Feedback

Focus groups believe that, at an individual employee level, colleagues do share the same fundamental values toward safety. At its most simplistic no one wants to contribute to a situation that may cause somebody else harm. Beyond that there is all style of variation. Quite a few focus group participants believe that the OH&S Policy is of little value. It is seen as an exercise in being seen to do the right thing. Indeed the majority of employees could not identify its location, or its content.

Again all focus groups indicated that they believe the values of Aardvark Cement Products have immeasurably changed over the last eighteen (18) months or so. Whilst there was the odd focus group participant who acknowledged that such might be expected from an “interventionist owner”; nobody saw the “change” in values as being a positive change.

What does the predominant management style at Aardvark Cement Products feel like?

Whilst management commitment has been shown to be a key factor in how successful an organisation is able to achieve quality safety outcomes, the style of management which is practiced throughout the business is of, at least, equal importance here. If you have autocratic managers who are quick to try and apportion responsibility (blame); rather than explore the systemic factors involved, you very quickly develop a culture where employees only report incidents if they are compelled to. At extreme levels employees participate in practices such as “injury hiding” to avoid such attention. A participatory (transformational) management style, which overtly values the unique contributions of all involved, is that which has the most powerful positive influences upon safety.

Management style is generally perceived by the workforce to be consistent, trending in the positive direction; although there are clear pockets of discontent, and these are not necessarily small. Of some concern here is the observation that significant numbers of Employees/Non-supervision (20%) suggest that they fear being “labelled" if they approach their management. This proportion rises when we consider the operational workforce (25%). It is these particular levels of employees who most workplaces are encouraging to become more actively involved in hazard identification, risk assessment, and all sorts of safety related oversight. If at the same time there are significant groups within these areas who believe they will be “labelled" as problematic should they raise something that might be a little contentious, then generally they shall keep it to themselves. How often do you hear, after a safety incident, something similar to “I thought something like that might happen”. A real challenge to the style of management within a workplace is to develop the skills and attributes within its management structure, where employees feel able to discuss almost anything with the majority of supervisor/managers etc. This would not appear to yet be the case at Aardvark Cement Products.

Another mirror into management style is the item that goes directly toward a participatory or singular approach. In other words, is Aardvark Cement Products experienced as a co-operative workplace or is it “everyone for themselves”. Most work classifications strongly reject the latter position; which demonstrates positive regard for aspects of management style within Aardvark Cement Products.

The Employee/ Non-supervision classification is one area where a significant number of employees (29%) do actually report feeling as though it is “everyone for themself". If we take the conservative approach to analysis, and add the “undecided”, this increases to a much more significant result (47%). Only approximately half report feeling as though there exists a participatory management style, whilst the rest agree that it is “everyone for themselves”, or just don’t seem to be able to express a definitive position.
Focus Group Feedback

When it comes to management style focus groups were unable to identify a prevailing style. They did report wide variation throughout all levels of the organisation. Most focus groups reported a pretty open management style within Aardvark Cement Products. This was in contrast to a quite critical view of “management” when discussing visiting staff from the Bulli location.

Focus groups, almost universally, made reference to “management by SI”. When further enquiries were made as to what was meant by this description, participants strongly expressed views that an “approach” now existed that almost required the raising of an SI prior to expecting anything to be done/prioritised within the business. It was during discussions about “management style” that many focus group participants expressed views that the SI program had become the key management tool and was “out of control”. The majority of persons expressed the view that it had become a “numbers exercise”, which has resulted in people feeling very exposed. Reward systems were described as “tokenistic” and, when asked, not one employee admitted to the “reward” being an incentive to seek/submit SI’s. Examples were given of interstate employees having plant “walk-throughs” whose purpose was to identify SI’s. Interstate employees expressed the view that this made them feel very uncomfortable.

Are Aardvark Cement Products employees seen to be compliant with Safety Rules?

Whilst we might like to try and take the position that we do not need “rules” and that “common sense” should be enough; experience shows this to be an highly inaccurate, and patently dangerous position. All workplaces require a set of safety rules (read safety policy and procedures) that have been carefully developed and implemented as a mechanism for reducing exposure to accident and injury. The safety rules are only one tool in the armoury of workplace safety. They are necessary; although we know that employees deviate from the defined “rules” for all sorts of reasons. One of the key interests of safety science is exploring the reasons why people make such decisions.

Within this administration of the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey we find a number of data slices hunting very close, if not in, the Red Zone. For example if we go right for the jugular and ask whether people feel it is acceptable to deviate from defined safety procedures we do get a bit of a scare. We find that one third (34%) of operational employees agree that some safety rules do need to be followed. We see an almost identical result emanating from the administrative staff (33%). These two groups make up the bulk of respondents to the survey protocol conducted within Aardvark Cement Products.

If this observation is not a cause for concern, it should be. There is also more than a little concern that one member of the senior management team strongly agrees that this is acceptable. Approximately half (53%) of the operational employees believe you should NOT depart from safety requirements; that leaves a further fifty percent (50%) who either are not expressing a view, or actually say this is OK. Ouch! This is not a message you want at any
level within your organisation. One question we must then ask is; why do such a proportion of employees hold this view?

One issue which is important is that employees actually have an understanding as to why certain procedures exist and where they fit into the overall scheme of safety management within the organisation. The graphical representation at right should resonate loudly. Significant numbers of employees either feel that there are some safety rules and procedures that are not really practical. Are these the ones that significant numbers of operational and administrative employees feel it is OK to ignore? We don’t actually know do we? What we do know is when a system event occurs there shall be all sorts of action to try and get to the bottom of why it occurred. At its conclusion there may well be various levels of responsibility meted out. Some of this shall be squarely recognised as “punishment” at the individual level. Underlying all of this is a significant and consistent view that many of these very processes, are clearly being breached from time to time, are considered impractical by many in the workplace. On the basis of this evidence, there is a clear indication that an education program focussed upon the goal of reinforcing the basis of an integrated health and safety management system may be warranted.

At this point, we shall come back to another lighthouse item. Is it ever necessary to breach a safety requirement for the sake of a perceived need to reach a production goal? It is gravely concerning that we see one in five (22%) operational employees agreeing that it is actually necessary. We also see an identical number sitting on the fence. This is another area where we want to see near zero agreement on the “agreement” side of the equation. When we remove the senior managers and supervisor results from within the operational data, the result reaches almost one third. This is an area which clearly requires further attention. When we look at accident data we often find that enough accidents occur when people are following procedure. When they are not, the likelihood of a system failure is significantly elevated.

The senior management team provide a very definitive positive profile here. There is one hundred percent (100%) agreement that safety rules and procedures should never be compromised for the sake of production. There is indicated a need to further communicate,
by both word and deed, that this is a fundamental value position of Aardvark Cement Products. Whilst the senior management team support this view wholeheartedly, that is not being as well understood by other areas of the workforce, as it should.

When we look at the overall result contained within the SAFE-T-PLEX we see that the Aardvark Cement Products senior leadership team rates the dimension of “Safety Rules” very high, and actually borders on the edge of the Green. If such perceptions were mirrored by the remainder of the workforce, we would be well satisfied. This is not the case though. The organisational result, with regard to “Safety Rules”, whilst deeply embedded within the Amber Zone, is actually far closer to the Red Zone than we would like.

Focus Group Feedback

Out of Control! That was a common theme from within almost all focus groups surveyed. Safety was what they were talking about. Employees strongly felt that the focus on safety has become so extreme as to be a real “pain”. Many operational employees acknowledged that they selectively apply some safety rules, and feel that all it should take is “common sense”.

Operational focus groups, to a man, stated that if they worked safely and complied with all the various “rules and procedures” they’d never get a anything done. One group gave the example of product being packaged straight out of the oven, to be put on a vehicle waiting in the loading dock. This degree of pressure was stated to be a factor in people feeling as though they have to “take the odd shortcut” to get the job out. It should be noted that Aardvark Cement Products has many long-term employees working within the operational area. Therefore, one cannot discount the scenario that employees see the job getting on the truck as being the ultimate goal; and a demonstration of employee commitment toward the success of the business. Such a view, if viable, needs to be challenged by all levels of supervision; particularly at direct line level.

What does the workforce think about the management of accidents and incidents?

Some would say accidents and incidents are what safety is all about; or particularly the absence of them. Whilst that is true, the manner in which they are approached and resolved at the workplace level, and how this is understood to occur, by the workforce in general, is critical to the development of a robust safety culture that is able to introspectively explore the accidents and incidents that may occur and use the learning’s from these experiences to build and sustain a more effective safety aware environment. Employees also need to have confidence in the systems that underpin the outcomes of safety investigations. If not, the organisation is in for very rough ride indeed.

Our focus towards the management of accidents and incidents takes the form of exploration of investigations, application, confidence, timeliness and seriousness. Whilst the management team is arguably the more confident about many of these parameters, there are some positions which do ensure this result maintains its place overall well within the Amber Zone. It is here that Aardvark
Cement Products, demonstrates a trend towards a positive profile, although there are also some real concerns embedded within the results. Only half (53%) of the operational workforce express confidence that incident investigations actually get to the root cause of the problem. Of that half, over one quarter (28%) are in strong agreement that the incident investigations are of high quality. This is the same group of employees where the majority of incidents have occurred within Aardvark Cement Products for the preceding several years. What we do also need to be very concerned about though is the one third (34%) of operational employees who do not have confidence in the incident investigations that are undertaken. Whilst the sample size within laboratory operations was relatively small, proportionally they track perfectly with the profile offered by the operational workforce.

The level of confidence reported by the Senior Management team is at the maximum. All senior managers report confidence in the quality of the incident investigations. As can be seen above, such a view does not track with the more general views contained within the overall workforce.

When we begin to look at how Aardvark Cement Products views the quality of incident investigations, from a slightly different perspective, we gain further insights into this critical factor. In this case we are looking at a deliberately sequenced item that goes to the interface between conducting an “investigation” and then communications the results of those investigations to the workforce. This is not about the acceptance of any conclusions. It is solely about the communication of investigation conclusions etc. In this regard we see quite a well structured profile coming from the operational workforce. The operation staff are quite strongly indicating here that they feel that they see incident investigation results in a timely manner. All in all, there is limited disagreement here, although the laboratory area shows significant uncertainty here.

When we look at this question via the lens of employment level we do see that a significant proportion of the senior management team (29%) have a less positive view with regard to this question.

A very positive observation to be drawn from within this factor is that the workforce, at all levels, certainly acknowledges, consistently and powerfully, that accidents and incidents are taken seriously when they do occur. When we explore this item via work location we see an identical optimal profile. There are also unprecedented levels of certainty shown within all the response profiles.
There may be other questions that arise, and have arisen, although apathy toward accidents and incidents is clearly and evidently not one of them. The key here then is ensuring that the procedures that are put in place, and how they are communicated to the workforce, are enhanced in such a way that these outcomes are experienced within a more positive frame.

*Focus Group Feedback*

Focus groups were generally positive in the language when discussing the investigations that would take place following an incident. Some operational focus group members felt that the process was an exercise in trying to find someone to blame; although it needs to be acknowledged that this was a minority view. The majority of staff, even those expressing lesser positive opinions, was that Aardvark Cement Products was committed to trying to maintain a safe workplace.
7 ANALYSES

7.1 The Transformational Safety® Leadership Survey

The analyses presented below summarise the insights gained from the analyses of the Transformational Safety® Leadership Survey competencies.

7.1.1 Aardvark Cement Products Transformational Safety® Leader-Plex

Data Sliced by Department

Data Sliced by Employment Level
The Invisible Man

In the world of safety “invisibility” is not a leadership trait that we should be aspiring to. You can often identify invisible safety leaders by the sheer fact that you never seem to be able to find them around. We know from myriads of organisational research that this leadership trait provides a negative impact on the organisations safety culture. Organisations that demonstrate significant behaviours of avoidance such as that indicated by The Invisible Man contribute directly to dangerous workplaces.

At Aardvark Cement Products we find “invisibility” as being an issue within certain areas within the operation.

We know this due to the hierarchal manner of data analysis. When operational employees participated in the Transformational Safety® Leadership Survey we find that well over half (63%) of them feel their supervisor is never around when something happens. This is not good to see. Very few (23%) actually disagree with the statement. Having said that First Line Supervision expresses an even greater proportional opinion (67%) in this regard. This is very concerning; when we look at this item via employment level we consistently see that the majority of employees, irrespective of their place within the virtual structure, agree with the above. This is not what you want people to be experiencing.

A key factor within effective safety leadership is in the realm of safety decision making. Persons who are seen to “avoid” safety related decision making add to a sense of absence and invisibility from the safety equation. Whilst two thirds (67%) of operational employees report that their supervisor just won’t seem to make safety decisions when they feel they are required. The remaining one third (33%) categorically state otherwise. The operational workforce is polarised with respect to this question. There is no uncertainty shown here at all. We also see here that again the operational workforce offers a profile which is distinctly different from the rest of Aardvark Cement Products operations.

40 See the supporting DVD-Rom for the graphical representation of this observation within the Reports section.
When we ask employees about the “quality” of responses from their leadership we again can see a distinctly different pattern emerging from the operational employees. Half of the employees (53%) disagree with the statement “When you ask my line manager/supervisor anything about safety you just can’t get a straight answer”; the remainder either don’t express an opinion either way (20%), or actually agree (27%) with the contention. In contrast all other employees of Aardvark Cement Products reject the contention – that is what you actually want to see here.

When we directly ask about “invisibility” employees provide a much more positive view at both level and location. This is a far more direct question which goes to the nub of the competency. The responses are within an acceptable range when confronted with this particular item. Operational employees do remain elevated, when compared to all other work areas, with one quarter (23%) of their number describing their supervisor as “Mr Invisible”. This is another polarised profile with over two thirds (70%) of this group disagreeing with that description. It would appear that there may be issues of consistency with regard to the supervision structure within the operational work areas. Clearly significant numbers of employees are experiencing their supervision in a positive light with limited “invisibility”. Unfortunately, the numbers who do ascribe the invisibility behaviours are significant enough to remain concerning.

When we consider the question of “invisibility” through the lens of employment level we see a slightly different picture. The overall Transformational Leadership Safety Leadership descriptor known as The Invisible Man is further elevated – to be moving well into the Red Zone.

In the world of safety leadership we do not wish to experience any sense of “invisibility”. Of all the passive-avoidant behaviours “The Invisible Man” is the most critical and every effort must be made to extinguish it within any business.

Things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Invisible Man” would be:

- Ensures all safety related matters are followed up immediately
- Makes sure those safety issues we all know have been around for a while are dealt with.
- Makes sure there are no “unnecessary” delays in responding to issues.
- Is very careful not to “avoid” getting involved just because it might be difficult, problematic, political, etc
- Makes sure they are readily accessible, and visible.

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41 By using the lens of employment level, we filter out any supervisors and/or senior managers who may work within particular work areas.
The Fireman

What is it that a Fireman does. They sit in their fire-house doing whatever they do in there. It is only when there is a fire that you see the “rubber on the road”. It might be said that a fireman is for the most part “hard to find”; although they do pop-up when there is a safety incident that demands their attention. When things have settled down they disappear back to the fire-house. If you are seeing some similarities here with The Invisible Man you are right on the money. Like The Invisible Man it can be shown that organisations full of Fireman are likely to be defined as “at risk”. We want to see minimal fireman-like safety leadership behaviours within an organisation.

At Aardvark Cement Products we are seeing some “fireman” like behaviour being experienced. Again our goal for this area is that we see it as minimally as possible, so we might suggest “anything is too much”. It is for that reason you find no Green Zone for the passive-avoidant behaviours. Indeed the Amber Zone is quite small, and only Best Practice organisations are able to sustain their performance within the Amber Zone. The majority do tend to find themselves visiting the Red Zone.

Whilst the reader is encouraged to review the associated Data Slice reports which have been independently supplied it is relevant to isolate the following items for review within this document. A common fire fighting item is that which targets “reactivity” when it comes to safety matters. In general we see descriptions of supervisors being primarily reactive by about fifteen percent (15%) of the overall workforce. The trend is good, with the majority not seeing “reactivity” as a significant issue. Both operational and laboratory work areas are slightly more elevated, though only just.

Another item which demonstrates the close relationship between “invisibility” and “reactivity” is all about just “leaving others to deal with safety matters”. It is not so much about “hiding”; it is more about being seen as being somewhat apathetic and just “letting things go where they go”. What we find here, that some may find a little perplexing, is that we have almost one third (29%) of the Senior Management group stating that they agree that their supervisor leaves others to deal with safety matters. Not an optimal result within a small management team, which validates consistency of response when we see an almost identical profile within similar items.

What must demand attention of thought, is the very low number of employee/non-supervision respondents (28%) who actually disagreed with this statement. Whilst there was a measure of uncertainty here (26%), almost half of these employees (47%) report that their supervisors’ practice this “fireman” like behaviour.

When we look at this particular behaviour from the perspective of work location we find over half (53%) of operational employees that their supervisor etc leaves others to deal with safety matters. That is an extreme result. When we look at the actual profiles across all work areas there is not one work area that offers a near positive profile. The sales and marketing team, along with interstate operations, show a trend in the right direction. The remainder of the workforce is either showing a negative result or a significant level of indifference opinion.
There is a clear need for the organisation to more introspectively look at the detail around specific “freighting” behaviours, and develop strategies to minimise their influence within the workforce.

Another item that contributes to an overall understanding of this document is concerned with the perception of a “hands-off” approach. Not quite invisibility, but getting close. The less specific language of the item means the response profile is generally less aggressive. That has certainly been the case, with relatively low numbers of employees across all work areas agreeing with this statement. Make no mistake, that is a good thing. It unfortunate though when we target the item to more specific behaviours, rather than a more generic view, we see respondents ascribing a greater frequency of “fire fighting” passive-avoidant behaviours.

Things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Fireman” would be:

- Makes sure they “involve” themselves in safety related matters.
- Does not wait for things to “break”, before they try and fix them.
- Does not allow any issues to fall into the “too hard” basket
- Does not wait for a complaint or incident to occur before taking action on “known” problems.
The Policeman

What is it that a Policeman does. Their primary attention is on looking for breaches of the law etc. In the Transformational Safety® Leadership System “policeman” are about ensuring that we are following regulations, SOP’s, work instructions etc. When you look at the Policeman Leader-Plex slice you shall notice something a little different. We actually do want police-like leadership behaviours demonstrated by our safety leaders, although we need to be careful we are not doing it “too much”. In strongly autocratic police like cultures we find people complying with SOP’s etc only when they feel “watched”. Too much “policing” also destroys initiative and thinking within the minds of staff; something which we actually want to encourage in the safest of cultures.

The Transformational Safety® Leadership competency of “policing” is the first where we acknowledge that we have a best practice zone that “floats”. The regularity frameworks in which we operate “demand” that we have “police like” practices in place. Ongoing auditing of systems, traditional BBS oversight etc., are all aspects of “policing” and they all have there place. They have all shown to provide, when implemented appropriately, a positive impact upon the systems they are interrogating.

Aardvark Cement Products shows that the Transformational Leadership competency known as “The Policeman” consistently falls within the Green Zone. It does not matter how we slice the data this result remains in the Green Zone. What this means is that the level of policing in place within Aardvark Cement Products clearly falls within the optimal zone consistent with the theoretical position of The Transformational Safety® Culture Improvement System.

There is some evidence that the senior management team sees “policing” to be trending towards the upper edge.

Generally though Whatever Aardvark Cement Products is doing in this area, they just need to keep doing. The manner that it is perceived by all levels of the workforce is appropriate to the needs of an effective traditional safety system design.
The Dealer

“Dealing” is arguably the fundamental basis upon which most of our organisations are based. It explores aspects of safety leadership behaviours that are consistent literally with doing deals. That may seem a little abstract, yet we do this all the time. Consider that most of us go to work and expect to be paid for what we do. In other words we have a fundamental relationship with our employer that is based on “doing a deal” from the very beginning. Within some safety systems there are aspects of “reward”; eg the safety points systems, the safety “bingo’s” etc. and they have been shown to have some efficacy. Dealing within a safety culture works; probably because it is something which we fundamentally understand. As indicated we do it all the time, both at work and at home. Like policing though we can do it too much. If something is about getting something back, particularly material, for anything we do we may become very mercenary in our approach. We also create cultures that are strongly demarcated; which, in itself, can create large safety holes within the safety system.

When we look at what people are saying about “dealing” we find that Aardvark Cement Products have located themselves within the optimal Green Zone again; only just though. The Aardvark Cement Products group norms place the result right on the cusp of the Amber Zone. Make no mistake here, this is a good result. Operational employees are also showing a view which places the organisation on the “edge” of the Green and Amber Zones, at the upper end.

The first line supervision team have stepped a little outside into the Amber Zone on the “active” side. Only a little and not an issue to be at all concerned about – worth keeping an eye on though.

As can be seen from the graphical representation at left, there is general agreement that satisfaction is shown when safety targets are met. There is NO disagreement which is good to see. Almost all employment levels within the business are showing the optimal profile. The area to work on here is bringing down the level of neutrality within the middle management group and working toward a mirror of the optimal profile.

Some other things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Dealer” would be:

- Ensures that sufficient time is built into all safety projects for review of outcomes against targets.
- Ensures that goals are clear and based upon need, along with input from all parties concerned.
- Will have contingencies prepared to deal with unexpected “speed bumps” along the way and ensure that followers are appraised of their existence.
- Makes sure than when discussing safety outcomes, there is overt recognition of things well done and explanation as to why they are important.
The Knight

What is it that Knight's have been known for, particularly in medieval times. Hopefully you are thinking about a person who is highly ethical and practices what they preach, lead's by example, and “walks the talk”. To some degree Knights might also stand out from the crowd (though not always). The Knight is the first of the transformational safety® leadership constructs. You will note the Best Practice Zones have shifted. We actually cannot experience too much transformational safety® leadership behaviours within our work experience. Ideally we wish to see a consistent demonstration of transformational safety® leadership behaviours peppered through the culture of the organisation. In other words we want to be “seen in the green” as much as possible. We do not with to be “dead in red” and we can live with being in the Amber Zone, as long we are continually striving to live in “the Green”.

We find “The Knight” being consistently Amber throughout Aardvark Cement Products; pretty much squarely in the middle. The Senior Management profile shows that this group intuitively knows where “safety leadership” needs to be; and to some extent believes they are nearly there. This is not being experienced to the same degree though by the workforce in general. There is a very powerful exclusion to this observation and it appears to be the experience of first line supervisors within Aardvark Cement Products. This group strongly considers their supervisors to be practicing “knight like” safety leadership behaviours. Whilst this is valuable, what is all quite clear is that this group would not appear to be mirroring those influences within their own leadership. The Middle Management group are on the edge of “Red” when it comes to The Knight – this is brought about by significant indecision on a number of items.

When we look at these results via work location we see wide variation within this competency. The result though tracks very closely within the Amber Zone.

Some things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Knight” would be:

- Ensures that optimal safety behaviours are modelled by way of their own behaviour; the worst thing they can do “is say one thing, and do another”.
- Seek genuine feedback opportunities regarding their own safety behaviours and appropriately apply that feedback.
- Shall share personal stories, anecdotes journeys about safety, and other things, with team members – regularly and appropriately,
- Shall demonstrate enthusiasm for the “journey” and ensure that all players are in the game.
- Be willing to wear “errors” and acknowledge the “learning’s” that come from openly doing so.
- Share personal “beliefs” about safety and make sure that behaviours are consistent with those beliefs.
- Give all people the opportunity to participate in decision making in a meaningful way; if it is just “lip service”; don’t bother!
- Be willing to ask followers where they think personal safety behaviour improvements might be made.
- Responds immediately to issues as they become “known”; without waiting for an incident or a request.
- Shall only make safety decisions after having genuinely sought the input of all around.
The Carer

This TransformationalSafety construct pretty much speaks for itself. Cultures demonstrating the very important “caring” behaviours show people who actually know each other beyond the superficial “masks” that many of us regularly wear at work. Caring safety leadership is further indicated by safety leaders who are genuinely interested and concerned about the contributions of their followers. Caring TransformationalSafety leaders go out of their way to treat their followers as individuals. There is definitely no “pack” mentality in the minds of these leaders. The “caring” leader is trusted by their followers. People within the business know they can approach people within this culture without fear of retribution. They know that outcomes shall be fair and equitable. The Carer construct should not be misinterpreted as being “soft”. It is about being considerate and concerned for the individual safety needs of followers.

For the most part Aardvark Cement Products employees report “caring” profiles well within the Amber Zone. There is visible a very close marker, with respect of laboratory operations, almost in the Red Zone on this dimension, certainly worthy of some further thought. The result appears conspicuous, when compared to the other work locations.

First line supervision is leading the race to the Green, when it comes to The Carer. This is an excellent result, within an organisation that shows itself to rarely able to reach this level of result.

Employees/non-supervision are on the low side of Amber, trending towards the Red Zone. Senior management are right in the mid-point of the Amber Zone here.

These sorts of consistent Amber results tell us that the various levels of employment within Aardvark Cement Products are reporting safety leadership behaviours consistent with “The Carer”; the laboratory employees are somewhat excluded from this observation. The fact that these behaviours are being recognised means that the primary focus needs to be on increasing consistency and frequency.

Some other things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Carer” would be:

- Ensuring that the individual needs of employees are met and that they are understood; one size does not fit all!
- Ensuring that when they see good safety practice, or someone just going the “extra mile” for safety (or anything else for that matter) they comment at the time (immediacy); rather than file it away for later.
- Shall encourage those around them to increase their “involvement” within the organisation, and provide active support in assisting them achieve these goals.
- Shall behave more and more like a “Safety Coach”; rather than a traditional oversight supervisor – this would require the development of targeted Safe-T-Coach competencies.
- Ensure that they are familiar with the safety training and development opportunities which are available and be quick in encouraging their people to take advantage of those opportunities.
- Make it their “lot in life” to become more knowledgeable about those around them
  - What is important to them
  - Names of family members – this is EXTREMELY powerful when somebody goes to the trouble
  - What do they like doing in their spare time etc
- Become familiar with the different “drivers” that their people have. It is not always money!!
- Make sure they are aware of the difficult times in peoples lives and genuinely express concern at these times and finds ways to demonstrate same through some small act of consideration.
- Become more adept at looking for the “feelings” behind the words – training and development with EQ might be a developmental need.
- Be willing to “bend the rules” (NOT break) if necessary to show the true level of appreciation for a particular task which may have been undertaken.
The Innovator

Innovation is about thinking. It is about actively promoting and encouraging a culture of learning at both the individual and group level. Safety Leaders who demonstrate an innovative style are regularly challenging their followers to develop solutions to safety issues themselves, or in partnership with their colleagues. It is NOT about telling how things “should” or “must” be done. The Innovator demonstrates trust in the intellectual development of their people. Whilst it is tempting to “save time” by just telling people how to do it; there is a lot more to be gained by encouraging people toward independent and supported learning. In the safety world continuous improvement is gained by having a transformational balance of innovation within safety development.

Innovation at Aardvark Cement Products does not see any consistently strong profiles displayed. The exception to this observation seems to exist with the senior management and first line supervision results.

The image at left shows quite a good result by the operational workforce for one specific item which contributes to the overall result here. There is almost no disagreement here, which is a positive outcome. In contrast you can also see one of the reasons why the laboratory work location tracks so poorly within this particular competency. The high levels of uncertainty certainly do nothing to assist here. All work locations though show performance here mid-range within the Amber Zone.

Some other things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Innovator” would be:

- Ensuring that there are far greater levels of “inclusion” within workplace safety; this means asking, considering AND responding with observable behaviours.
- Make far greater use of “brainstorming”; even on the “side of the road”.
- Makes it very clear about seeking a range of options and giving those opinions genuine (and visibly genuine) consideration.
- Encourages and provides those around them to come up with innovative ideas to deal with the day to day challenges around the workplace.
- Personally spends time thinking bailout “new ways” to approach tasks and speaks to those oared them about how these “new ways” might work.
- Demonstrates a willingness to consider all issues from all angles.
- Shall “rock the boat”, if necessary. To ensure that the ideas put forward are given an opportunity for success.
- Shall place strong emphasis on problem solving amongst the team.
- Shall be prompt and loud in giving credit to team members for presenting new ideas about workplace safety.
- To develop the skill of reflecting back what they have been told (active listening) prior to offering suggestions or opinions.
- To be well aware there are many roads leading to the same destination; it is OK to experiment with a different route.
The Motivator

The Motivator is exactly as it sounds. It is about safety leadership behaviours that are dynamic in motivating followers toward improved safety performance. Leaders who demonstrate behaviours consistent with The Motivator are powerfully positive about the safety journey and are inspirational in their approach to safety. They often mix their “motivational” behaviors with those attached to “innovation”. Such organisations often find their safety systems respond exothermically to such behaviours.

Aardvark Cement Products’s profiles for the Transformational Safety® Leadership competency defined as “The Motivator” shows some significant room for active transition. All work locations and employment levels are around the mid range of the Amber Zone; with most trending down toward the Red Zone. Aardvark Cement Products senior management shows a result approaching Green. There is such a clear separation between this result and the remainder of employment levels, as to indicate a difference around the question of “consistency” around this dimension. On this dimension we see the first real “separation” of perception between senior management and first-line supervision. When we look more closely at individual profiles we find that the quality of result has been impacted by relatively consistent uncertainty across the majority of work locations and employment levels.

There shall be great value in independently reviewing the item profiles within the associated data slice reports which are also provided on the Support CD, which is an integral component of the Transformational Safety® Culture/Leadership Assessment protocols.

Safety Leadership is very much about inspiring a sense of confidence and believability toward the effective delivery and participation within the health and safety systems within which we are exposed. That means essentially that, particularly if we are in a supervisory role within the workplace, that our words and actions provide those levels of “believability” and “confidence.

Some other things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Motivator” would be:

- Taking advantage of opportunities that present themselves which allows the highlight of safety performance and promoting these consistently and strongly.
- Regularly discussing the rewards we can all achieve through greater attention to what we are all doing with respect to workplace safety – focussing on rewards being far more than “money”.
- Ensure clarity and consistency of message with respect to expectation regarding workplace safety.
- To spend time creating an environment of cooperation and “fun” that enables the inclusion of this energy toward the safety journey.
- To acknowledge that any “change” includes some resistance, and to see these as opportunities for exploration and motivation, not “defence” and “avoidance”.
- To actively and loudly promote the performance of those around them to others within the organisation; particularly more senior managers and leaders.
- To comment on the safe work behaviours of those around them (not just keep it to themselves) and loudly praise those who do “something special” for safety.
- To be willing to “roll up the sleeves” and “get dirty” when the circumstances warrant, and to do so with enthusiasm and opportunity - not begrudgingly.
- Ensure that those around them know the interrelationships of all tasks being completed and how we all fit into the “bigger picture” of safety performance at Aardvark Cement Products.
- Develop a reputation for focussing on the glass being “half full”; not “half empty”.
- Encourage those around them to personally explore development opportunity that might be available, both in respect of safety and personally.
- Encourage an environment that openly discusses “challenges” without traditional defensiveness.
The Missionary

The Missionary is all about “let’s get this done together”. Heavily team focussed in their approach they advocate a great deal of confidence that the safety goals of the business are achievable. They demonstrate a strong sense of “mission”, and are sometimes thought of as being a bit charismatic or “over the top”. This sense of zealousness is often understood and “forgiven” as followers certainly can see the sense of genuine concern for safe outcomes that The Missionary demonstrates. There is a strong requirement for consistency with Missionaries. It is very difficult to “fake” these behaviours, as cultures are generally extremely adapt at identifying any machiavelian missionaries within their midst.

It is within the Transformational Safety® Leadership construct of “The Missionary” that we see the most impressive profile from within all items of The Transformational Safety® Leadership Survey. The area of “ethics” is becoming one of increasing importance within business, and we see that Aardvark Cement Products employees, with only a few exceptions, acknowledge this to be the case.

Whilst it has been clear that there are challenges within various work areas regarding how, at times, this might pan out into “actions”; when it comes down to it the business sees itself universally as being fair and ethical with regard to workplace safety. When we slice the data via employment level there are no significant differences to the above profile.

It is when we look at some of the other factors that contribute to the sense of “mission” then things do not appear so powerfully Green. For example, “consistency” between word and deed is amongst the most powerful influencers we have when we are trying to develop a relationship that includes words like trust, honesty and integrity. When people see difference between what we “say” and what we “do” it leads to all sorts of “confusions”; both personally and organisationally. When asked about “walking the talk” it needs to be said that there is minimal disagreement, which is good. The level of uncertainty (or indifference) though is proportionally significant. The Sales/Marketing and Administration areas present optimal profiles here. When we look at this data through the lens of employment level, we also see low levels of disagreement (which is good); although high levels of indifference (which is not good).

Another key factor when trying to develop a sense of “mission” with respect to safety performance is a little something that comes from the world of advanced communication. We might call this “self disclosure”. It is where we speak a little about our own “self” and the reasons why we might do things. In essence it is about sharing something of our personal value system. By sharing these sorts of details we are demonstrating a sense of trust amongst those around us. Highly functional teams often have a significant sense of mission and at the same time share a “value system” that they have developed through inclusive communication.
We can see that there are clearly some people in the business who do this, although it is very inconsistent. Again the level of uncertainty is far higher than we would like to see. When see such a low level of disagreement, with such a high level of indifference the common recommendation is:- to keep doing what you are doing but do it more often and more overtly. As indicated, the whole construct of “self disclosure” is very powerful and should be a focus for developmental attention. One does need to be careful though, as to not give a false or artificial presentation.

When we think about “mission” as one of actively encouraging inclusiveness and team work we also see some inconsistent profiles within Aardvark Cement Products. Note the quite impressive result here from within the operational workforce. It is also relevant to note that the item refers to both managers and supervisors. What this means is that responses shall encompass the safety behaviours of that collective group, and does not try to delineate amongst specific levels of supervision. It should also be referenced that the Interstate employees are somewhat distant from their recognised “leader”, which may add some understanding to the high uncertainty response.

There is a demonstrated need to develop more “Missionaries” within Aardvark Cement Products. By so doing one begins to develop a more consistent safety leadership framework which becomes the foundation, and the glue, which holds the safety management system together during times of challenge and resistance.

Some other things for safety leaders to do that shall assist with the realisation of an optimal rating on “The Missionary” would be:

- To make sure they keep up “to speed” on the safety challenges in the workplace and look for opportunities to share what they see and believe.
- Keep a track of their fundamental beliefs about people and safety and make sure their behaviour remains consistent with those beliefs.
- To empathise, at every opportunity, the value of working together towards a safer workspace – to model this with their own behaviours and approach to work.
- Be willing to go that “extra mile” for the team and particularly remain focussed on the safety needs of those around them.
- To set an example “beyond expectation”; in respect of everything they do.
When it come to their involvement in safety matters, to always strive to deliver beyond the status quo.

To always ensure that if they commit to a process or task it is followed up; without the need to be reminded.

Be sure to confront negative outcomes with a sense of curiosity and learning; not try and “talk it away”.

Be willing to discuss their personal leadership style with others and look for personal opportunities to improve and get better.

Be active involving their own leaders in their own development as a safety leader; give these people overt permission to advise them when they think they are doing well, and not so well.
7.10 The Transformational Safety® Map of Aardvark Cement Products current safety leadership culture

Visual depiction of the impacts of Transformational Safety® Leadership Behavioural Competencies upon Safety Participation and Safety Culture
8 ANALYSES

8.1 The Transformational Safety® Survey Outcome Measures
8.2 The Transformational Safety® Survey Outcome Measures sliced by Employment Level

**Safety Values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Agreement Scale</th>
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<tr>
<td>Senior Management</td>
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<td>Middle Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Line Supervision</td>
<td>3.50</td>
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<td>Employee/Non Supervision</td>
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**Risk Awareness**

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**Risk Management**

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</table>
8.3 The Transformational Safety® Survey Outcome Measures sliced by Work Location

Safety Values

Risk Awareness

Risk Management
9 ANALYSES

9.1 The Transformational Safety® Survey Engagement Measures sliced by Work Location

![Safety Leadership Engagement](image)

![Safety Outcomes Engagement](image)
10 FOCUS GROUP THEMES

Aardvark Cement Products Focus Group Themes

The following are comments from within Focus Groups held at Aardvark Cement Products. They have been loosely edited for “sense”. The internal integrity of the “meanings” expressed have not been altered. In some cases they have been minimally “adjusted” to protect the innocent.

- Safety is a high priority.
- Stress reported is a problem.
- Shortcuts are taken.
- There is limited, if any, real recognition for safety.
- Trust exists with only a couple managers.
- Information overload.
- Morale: “lowest in living memory”
- Too high workloads and expectations.
- Stress symptoms are reported.
- Yes! Safety is a serious priority.
- Admin hazards not felt to be deemed a priority; verses factory.
- Safety is seen to be reactive there is a “flurry” of activity after incidents, lots of “know it alls”. Feeling that process is often about finding “blame”.
- There are pockets of “trust”; although this is reported to be very variable.
- Personnel do not receive any recognition for working safely. Believe it is not even noticed.
- Shortcuts are a problem.
- Keyboard issues are permanent shortcuts.
- Staff state they rely on commonsense.
- There is a feeling that people are talking about safety maybe a little more; not always positive.
- Quite a lot of administration staff thinks that safety management does not apply to them.
- SI’s have become an obsession – you’re always looking over your own shoulder.
- Information Overload.
- Safety training is minimal in administration area.
- Stress identified as hazard within administration area.
- Safety programs are felt to be somewhat autocratic and that there is a significant focus on “numbers”; rather than people.
- Need for more discretionary training.
- Issues with “Safety List”. Not felt to have been acted upon. No real feedback on items. Feel that only what is “cheap and easy” gets done.
- Training is felt to be of a mandatory nature. Minimal discretionary and/or developmental training.
- Personnel have minimal trust in management.
- Minimal recognition for working safety.
Nonconformity is a real problem. Supervisors do turn a blind eye and if the pressure is on they may be part of the problem.

Safety information provision is variable. Some staff state they hear of changes via the “grape vine”.

Staff, work together.

Commonsense seen as a great factor.

No real feedback on incident reports.

Belief that there is a “penny pinching” mindset.

If you are hurt you are just a number. They just try and force you back to doing something.

General lack of visibility/involvement by leadership.

Problems with supervisors that are “known”; yet ignored.

Safety is a serious focus.

Seen to be increasing.

Training felt to be pretty good though focuses on the mandatory.

Shortcuts are taken regularly.

Safety out of control.

We just need to “get the job done”.

Focus is on speed often greater than safety.

Supervisors cut corners when the pressure is on.

Workers not appraised about changes until well after they have been in place.

Some staff say they had become aware of changes in safety procedures from colleagues “grape vine”. Not through any communication. Feeling that you had to often be in the right place at the right time.

Lack of communication from some supervisors. Again it is felt that “management” know who these are.

Seemed to be confusion within the room about some procedures.

Tools generally of good quality.

Work pressures are always felt to be a problem.

Many feel the focus is on delivery time; rather than job/safety quality.

Accident flurry seen to be about blame.

Feel safety is a high priority.

Not a lot of recognition for working safely.

Variations across work areas.

Shortcuts do occur; can be dependant upon supervisors.

Feel we have a reactive culture.

Safety training is condensed.

Safety is a priority to save money only.

No real problems getting safety gear.

Consultation does occur although rarely acted on.

Works: If you have an injury you should not be here.

No real recognition for working safely.

People have been told there is no such thing as an accident.
- Shortcuts are taken to save money.
- Manual Handling is a common shortcut.
- Too much information - avalanche.
- Reactive to Injuries etc.
- Training is compacted.
- Access to tools not a problem.
11. **Author Biography**

![David G Broadbent](image)

**David G Broadbent**  
**Safety Psychologist**

**PROFILE**
A highly experienced and innovative corporate and counselling psychologist who has synthesised these frameworks into a value adding experience for a large and varied customer base. David is very focused upon the needs of his customers and this is evidenced by a business that continues to prosper within a referral network created by customer satisfaction.

David has highly developed interpersonal and groupwork skills and this has resulted in recognition both nationally and internationally for his pragmatic ability to deliver the most complex information in an entertaining and successful style.

**SKILLS SUMMARY**

- Highly experienced **Groupwork Facilitator**.
- Demonstrated **Program Development** skills within a variety of industrial environments.
- **Leadership Development** and **Change Management** strategist within organisational settings.
- Developed and implemented the **POWER© Management Systems**; an integrated management skillset collection.
- Development and provision of **Safety Management Systems** for both domestic and international consumption.
- Internationally recognised as one of Australia’s foremost commentators on **Full Range Leadership** and associations with corporate and safety outcomes.
- Creator of the **SAFE-T-TECHNOLOGIES**; an integrated relationship-based safety management system.
- **Industrial History** and a pragmatic ability to relate within all levels of an organisation; from the Stock Room to the Board Room.
- Industry leader in the development of **Trauma Recovery Solutions** within organisational frameworks.
- **Experienced presenter** to both small groups and large convention centres.

**CAREER HIGHLIGHTS**

- Director of Strategic Management Systems; a customer focused organisational psychology practice.
- Development of a trauma education package for one of Australia’s largest multi-national corporations.
- Creator of The Transformational Safety© System; the Worlds only integrated safety culture assessment system incorporating Transformational Leadership© Theory.

**QUALIFICATIONS**

- Bachelor of Arts (Psych-Hons) - 1987
- Certificate IV in Assessment & Workplace Training – 2000
- Advanced Trauma Specialist – International Critical Incident Stress Foundation - 2000

**EMPLOYMENT HISTORY**
Key Deliverables:

Leadership Development
- Designed the Lead to Succeed© Program - An outcome oriented leadership development program incorporating Full Range Leadership principles.
- Developed Good to Greater© - The Asia-Pacific’s first experiential workshop incorporating the seminal works of Jim Collins’ Good to Great.
- Developed Project to Success© - A Project Management education primer with particular emphasis upon integrated leadership competencies.
- Created the ATLAS© Paradigm: A leadership competency framework for developmental coaching.

Safety Culture Analysis
- Developed and implemented the Integrated Safety Culture Assessment© model drawing upon contemporary safety culture research.
- Regularly provides strategic advice to both domestic and international clients in regard to safety enhancement programs.
- Developed and provides a cross-cultural multi-lingual safety culture assessment system.
- Created The Transformational Safety© System: The worlds first fully integrated safety culture enhancement system incorporating Transformational Leadership Theory.

Occupational Health and Safety
- Assisted a key regional employer (local government) reduce their workers compensation exposure from $1,200,000 to $60,000 across three (3) years.
- Assisted a key regional employer improve their occupational injury return to work rate from 35% to 100% within a twelve (12) month cycle.
- Developed an integrated EAP/Injury Management System for a high stress work environment which improved return to rates from 0% to >80% within a twelve (12) month cycle.
- NSW Workcover accredited Rehabilitation Provider with the highest sustained Return to Work Rate for the preceding eight (8) years.

Coaching
- Foundation Member of the International Association of Coaches (IAC).
- Regularly provides corporate interventions using industry recognised coaching frameworks; eg GROW, ACHIEVE, and the IAC-15 Proficiencies.

Trauma Management
- Provider of Trauma Recovery Solutions throughout Australia
- Advanced qualifications in Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM)

Risk Assessment
- Development and implementation of Australia’s only risk management training programs based upon Operational Risk Management (ORM) principles: the risk management protocols utilised by the US Navy Seals.
- Accredited by the NSW Workcover Authority as a Premium Discount Adviser at the maximum rating.
- Regularly conducts Risk Assessments/Incident Investigations for numerous organisations.
PAPERS PRESENTED


“Organizational resilience following a major disaster”, The Cairn Energy Global HSE Conference, Taj Palace Hotel, NEW DELHI, INDIA, September 27th 2013

“Safety at the Sharper End: The application of the HRO Hallmarks to historical workplace disasters - processes which save lives”, The 3rd Annual South African Academy for Occupational Safety and Health Conference, Emperors Palace, Kempton Park, SOUTH AFRICA, 17th May 2013

“The recognition of Human Error as a fundamental contributor within the accident causation process”, IRCA Global Oman Seminar Series, Crowne Plaza Hotel, MUSCAT, OMAN, April 15th 2013

“Developing optimal behavioural safety within an Indian Oil Refinery – the application of Transformational Safety Leadership competencies”, Essar Oil, JAMNAGAR, INDIA, March 20th 2013


“Take a Second Look – An Exploration of the simplicities of Human Error and their contribution to Workplace Failure States”, Australian Foundry Institute National Conference, Crowne Plaza Hotel, COOGEE, AUSTRALIA, October 21st – 25th 2012


“SAFE-T-LEADER: The application of Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL) competencies within a multinational Indian operation”, ESSAR Projects, MUMBAI, INDIA, October 19th 2012


“The Tolerance of Risk: We should be scared, or should we?”, The American Society of Safety Engineers (ASSE) – Middle East Chapter, DHARHAN, SAUDI ARABIA, 20th September 2011


“The Development of The Transformational Safety Culture Improvement System and its application to safety improvement within the Petrochemical Sector”, XXVIIIth International Congress of Applied Psychology, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 11th – 16th July 2010
“Transformational Safety Leadership: It all comes home to South Africa – From Bass to Broadent”, A Professional Development Workshop convened by Murray & Roberts Cementation, Lonmin Resources and the South African Chamber of Mines, Lonmin Game Farm, RUSTENBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, 23rd September 2009


“Culture & Leadership: An exothermic business transaction”, TRANS-NET Professional Development Symposium, Corporate Training Centre, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA, 17th September 2009


“Oh @#$!, Where did that come from”, Keynote Address, Safety Institute of Australia Queensland Conference, Brisbane Conference and Exhibition Centre, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA, June 18th 2009

“Misdirection, misperception, and misunderstanding: An experiential journey through some of the “white noise” surrounding behavioural safety systems,” 2nd Annual BBS in Heavy Industries ASPAC Conference, Rendezvous Hotel, MELBOURNE, AUSTRALIA, 27th-28th November 2008


“What kind of Safety Leader are you?”, SAFEGUARD National Health and Safety Conference, SkyCity Convention Centre, AUCKLAND, NEW ZEALAND, 30th April - 1st May 2007


“Maximising Safety Performance via Leadership Behaviours”, 28th International World Congress of Psychology, BEIJING, CHINA, 8 -13 August 2004

“Managing Traumatic Incidents in the Workplace”, Futuresafe 2001, Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre, BRISBANE, AUSTRALIA, 6-8 June 2001

“Critical Incident Stress Management in the Workplace”, Huntersafe 2001 - Managing Workplace Risk, Newcastle City Hall, NEWCASTLE, AUSTRALIA, 8 – 9 March, 2001

"Occupational stress and rehabilitation; The need to give 'em EAP's", Third National Employee Assistance Professionals Association of Australia Conference, 9-10 November, 1994, AIRPORT SHERATON, SYDNEY, AUSTRALIA

"Occupational Stress Management: A practitioners perspective", Professional training developed for Queensland Psychology Group, Commonwealth Rehabilitation Service, MILTON, QLD, 24th August, 1994


How to Establish a Safety-Based Culture
Creating a Workplace Free of Illness and Injury Must start at the Top

Scott Gaddis,
Corporate Manager, Global Occupational Safety and Health
Kimberly-Clark Professional

June 2007
In a manufacturing environment, a company’s greatest asset is its workers, and protecting those workers from illnesses or workplace injuries is critical to success. Operating an injury-free facility is no longer a dream. In many workplaces, it has become a reality – and not just for a year, but for several years running. Creating a workplace that is free of illness and injury begins with one crucial decision: making safety a core value. Better yet, it should be an organization’s chief value.

At Kimberly-Clark Professional our safety vision calls for an absolute belief that every employee can create and maintain a workplace free of illness and injury. That vision has paid off with a current total incident rate of 0.7 versus 4.2 in 1996 and a current Severity Index Rate of 32.0 compared to 345.0 a decade ago. In 2005 and 2006 several of our manufacturing sites and a staff team achieved one year of work without injury. In fact, our best-in-class facility in Corinth, Miss., has sustained this level of performance for more than four years and is expected to exceed 1.5 million hours without a single injury or illness in 2007.

These results can be attributed to a culture that embraces safety and empowers employees to maintain a commitment to safety in everything they do. The key to this success is establishing a safety-based culture that starts at the top. In the past, manufacturers have been told that safety is a line-driven activity that must first be implemented at the bottom of an organization and then work its way to the top. But the reverse is true. Safety must start with an organization’s senior management team. Leadership must demonstrate an active commitment to safety and promote that commitment with a passion, down and through the entire organization. The very best leaders deliver safety values with true passion and understand that their employees are responsible for the company’s success. To improve the safety culture of an organization, the following should occur:

- The safety process must touch every person in the organization.
- Safety must be a permanent agenda item, discussed at the start of every meeting.
- Leaders must be held accountable for safety performance.
- Safety must be the operational fabric of a facility, not a separate function.
- Safety must be integral to every business activity.

OSHA concurs with this assessment stating that “the best Safety and Health Programs involve every level of the organization, instilling a safety culture that reduces accidents for workers and improves the bottom line for managers,” concluding that “when safety and health are part of the organization and a way of life, everyone wins.”

Under this approach “safety departments” do not exist. Safety professionals still have a vitally important role, but it shifts to a resource function that empowers others through capability development, coaching and mentoring. The very best safety programs are owned at the manufacturing line, utilizing production-level employees on teams to develop and implement the safety processes. Safety must also be aligned with all other business functions to ensure that it receives the resources and attention that it deserves.

To be successful, organizations should create career paths that turn employees into safety leaders by making sure that everyone is highly trained and motivated not just to succeed, but to exceed expectations. Workers should be mentored, to help them contribute to the safety process. The organization should also develop an environment and culture that supports the belief that every employee can create and maintain a workplace free of illness and injury. The result of this investment will be establishing, within workers, a sense of ownership of the safety process and a shift within the organization from an independent to an interdependent culture. This can help drive employees to eliminate unsafe behaviors and conditions and to focus on eliminating injuries entirely, rather than just meeting regulatory requirements.

According to OSHA, when a company’s safety culture is strong, “everyone feels responsible for safety and pursues it on a daily basis; employees go beyond ‘the call of duty’ to identify unsafe conditions and behaviors, and intervene to correct them.”
With this in mind, consider posting the following safety principles throughout your facility to remind employees of the importance your organization places on achieving its safety goals:

- Any person can and must confront unsafe behaviors and/or conditions. No one is authorized to disregard such a warning.
- No one is expected to perform any function or accept any direction that they believe is unsafe to themselves or others, or creates an unsafe situation, regardless of who directs such an action.
- Anyone who feels that a process is unsafe will shut down that process and work with appropriate team members to create a safe situation.

A Safety Process Model

Adhering to a simple process model is another highly effective component of an overall strategy for improving the safety of a manufacturing facility. The model below focuses on four aspects of safety:

- Leadership – As stated earlier, leadership is key. Leaders must lead and support the safety process wholeheartedly. They must communicate the importance of safety as well as the value and respect they have for the people who work for them. In addition, facility managers should meet regularly with staff to review safety events and issues, track progress and establish future goals, teach safety training sessions and participate in mentoring.
- Environment – It’s essential to ensure that the overall environment is safe, equipment is properly cared for, operating practices are adhered to and engineering standards are followed. To accomplish this, conduct a design safety review of all equipment from inception and a full ergonomic review before installation and bi-annually after that. Establish extensive inspection programs to ensure compliance and be on the lookout for new technologies to reduce risk. Always ask yourself what you can do to make the physical workplace safer and reduce risk.
- Personnel – Investing in people is paramount to success. The best organizations will first seek to hire the right people and then develop their capabilities and skill sets. Be sure to include questions about safety as part of the hiring process, to gain an understanding of a prospective employee’s knowledge of safety and to communicate your company’s commitment to safety. Also require safety/loss control training for all manufacturing employees, assign mentors to new and transferred employees and provide annual written safety valuations for all workers.
- Behavior and Expectations – Changing organizational behavior is what transforms a facility from good to world class. When passion for safety is driven by a leadership team, it filters down to the floor and will encourage workers to actively care about each other and fosters interdependence within the organization. The job of leadership is to train employees so they make the right decisions. Observation and feedback can help set expectations and change behavior. Teamwork is also critical to success.

Following a simple process safety model such as this can help steer a facility toward its goal of creating a safer workplace. But a successful safety program must also include honest self-inspection to continually improve. This means creating a system that enables production-level employees to communicate honestly to the facility manager and vice versa. Measurement tools should also be established to help determine what is working and what is not. And don’t be afraid of failing or not reaching established goals. Finding mistakes will allow an organization to make changes and adjust the safety process to close any gaps.

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Attachment 12.2

The Structure of Culture

Although “culture is everything” that goes on in an organisation (communications, procedures, housekeeping, the way of running meetings etc.), for practical purposes it can be considered to exist in layers. Some of the layers are directly observable, and some are invisible and have to be deduced from the things that can be observed in the organisation. A way of thinking about the layers of culture is shown below.

The Structure of Culture Map

**Underlying Assumptions**
Edgar Schien proposes that cultures are based on a set of underlying assumptions about reality. In the practical context, this means that an organisation will display observable artefacts and behaviours that result from what it assumes about things such as vulnerability to an event, the nature of people (how are they motivated) and the importance of following rules. Unless the leaders are intrusive about spreading the appropriate assumptions in their organisations, people will simply form assumptions based on their own experience. This is normally bad for a safety culture.

**Ideas and Knowledge**
The next layer of culture in organisations is the set of basic ideas and specialised knowledge that management and others have about what to do, why to do it and how to get it done in their organisation. There is therefore a whole layer of organisational culture made up of the patterns of thinking and ideas about things such as how to direct people, how to run meetings and whether to measure things. All of these ideas ultimately manifest themselves in observable forms such as documents and behaviours. In general it is management that leads the way in these patterns of ideas. However, management must also make sure that other people understand and hold the “right” thinking patterns for their tasks. Examples are where specialised knowledge or insight is key to performance (e.g. skilled operators, designers). In these cases the organisation must train and develop people to hold the appropriate ideas and insights for the situations that may be encountered.

**Patterns of Behaviour**
People in organisations develop patterns of behaviour that become deeply embedded and which are passed on to new staff very quickly. They range from the specialised (skills of the trade), through important traits such as complying with procedures or wearing (or not wearing) protective equipment, and into less defined areas like raising concerns and running meetings. These patterns of behaviour are the most obvious manifestation of the culture in the human dimension and ultimately are of critical importance to safety.

It is known that people will imitate others very strongly in order to “fit in” to a new culture, that patterns of behaviour are strongly triggered by specific situations, and that the patterns can be very hard to change. These facts mean that the task of leadership in guiding and shifting behaviours is a serious challenge and requires a long-term effort.

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40 For example, few people will have experienced a very severe event so the majority will hold unconscious assumptions about the probabilities and consequences of an event that are far removed from the assumptions required to drive a conservative and cautious approach.
Physical Things

The culture also exists in physical aspects such as documents, tools and equipment, housekeeping standards etc. These can be of vital importance to performance. If the physical environment makes it hard for someone to do "the right thing" but easy to do the wrong thing then performance will almost certainly suffer. An example would be out-of-date procedures. In this type of situation people will tend to apply their assumption that what is really required is to "do it right", and they will not follow the procedures. Procedural non-compliance then becomes a pattern of behaviour, which on occasion will cause a serious event when a correct procedure is not followed. At this stage (if the event was sufficiently serious) management will typically say: "We have a cultural problem".

Words, Language and Images

Finally the culture exists in words, language and images. Indeed without a structured language of organisational concepts and concerns people cannot effectively form a cohesive culture. It is an important task of leaders to create and use the language of an organisation. People become especially attached to jargon, and the use of specific language will also trigger specific behaviours. Therefore it is sometimes necessary to change the jargon and the language, or to introduce new images in order to change the culture.

Rules of Culture

There are some general rules of culture that can help to solidify the concepts.

1. In social cultures the layers generally tend to get more stable from the top down. However, in organisational cultures management has particularly strong control over the ideas and knowledge. This means that it is often easier to change the patterns of thinking in an organisation than to change its patterns of behaviour (e.g. new managers can come in with new ideas, but fail to get people to change their old behaviours.)

2. Cultures are not good or bad in themselves, but are good or bad at achieving certain results such as safety or quality.

3. There is always a safety culture in an organisation. The question is whether it is what management needs it to be, and whether it is improving or degrading.

4. Cultures are a product of social learning. Therefore they cannot be shifted without a learning orientation and without a lot of explanation and discussion as well as action.

5. Cultures have a natural tendency to degrade in the sense that the basic assumptions can get forgotten leaving the patterns of thought and action; these then degrade in turn through complacency, changes in personnel and other means. Therefore cultures always need renewal at the lower (invisible) layers, even to "stand still".

6. Leaders change culture by intervening at all levels: they hold new and different assumptions and patterns of thinking, they establish new patterns of behaviour and they can change the physical environment and the language and images. In particular, leaders constantly refresh the lower, invisible, layers of culture.

7. People do not generally know their own underlying assumptions, and people do not all hold the same underlying assumptions.

8. Cultures reduce anxiety for their members by establishing shared patterns of thinking, speaking and acting. Therefore changing the culture will always increase anxiety until the new patterns are learned. Leaders must make the anxiety of learning less than the anxiety of staying in the old culture.
Attachment 12.3

How to understand the Transformational Safety® Graphical Representations

The TransformationalSafety.Com Safety Zones.

In all visual representations of survey results TransformationalSafety.Com uses a “traffic light” metaphor to assist with a level of intuitive interpretation of the data. Green Zones are the target ranges for safety behaviours. You cannot see too much green. Amber Zones are levels of behaviours that we “can live with” as long as we are developing interventions that shall support moving the culture toward the green. You definitely want to be “seen in the green”. The Red Zones are where we do not want to be. If results are in the red then attention should be placed on moving the associated perceptions and behaviours, through the amber zone toward the green. You really do not want to be found “dead in red”. TransformationalSafety.Com is available to assist organisations develop strategies to achieve these objectives.

Interpreting graphical representations that have been Data Sliced.

If we consider the sample graphical representation to the left the first thing to “stand out” is the coloured arrow at the bottom. The direction of the arrow is the preferred direction where you wish to see the organisation placed. Once again you want to be “seen in the green”. You certainly do not wish to be “dead in the red”.

You will also notice that responses have been sliced against pre-determined factors that were identified during the Transformational Needs Analysis. Each Data Slice has been consistently provided with a unique colour to assist with visual interpretation. In this particular example we can see that those persons who identified as “administrative support” generally feel they don’t have a great deal of influence over health and safety performance within the business. Over 50% either have no real opinion (neither agree nor disagree) or actually disagree with the statement. Senior Management express the strongest opinion. There are varying levels of uncertainty within all employment levels as regards their level of influence.

When considering the individual item summaries the goal remains to maximise beliefs and behaviours toward the brighter green.

A word about opinions

Opinions are an interesting science. There are all sorts of theoretical positions on how we come to make them. Where there is pretty much universal agreement is that the amount of “effort” required to move a person away from the centre is greater the further they move away from that centre.

Think about it this way!

You ask a person the question: “I can influence health and safety performance around here”. They have a neutral opinion. How difficult, or easy, do you believe it would be to convince that person to have a position of “agreement”? How difficult, or easy, do you believe it would
be to convince that person to have a position of “disagreement”? I would suggest that it may well be about the same, dependant upon your skill of presenting an argument and reading their decision making cues. Professional sales people do this ALL the time. Next time you buy something via a sales person reflect on whether you walked out with exactly what you went in for. If you purchased something different, or a more expensive model; reflect on how your opinion was “adjusted”.

Now we have a different scenario. You actually “agree” with the statement. To then move that opinion to the “strongly agree” position takes more “effort” than the same movement from “neutral” to “agree”. It is critical then that we pay particular attention to the levels within the business who hold strong opinions toward the Red Zones. After all our behaviours are based upon our view of the world and those around us. If we have strong negative opinions about safety concepts (that have been shown to be cultural predictors) that shall inevitably show itself as the application of an unsafe behaviour. That which we are trying so powerfully to avoid.

A word of warning!

Do not be complacent about smallish proportions of the workforce “in the red”. We know that workplace safety is EXTREMELY sensitive to the smallest deviations from optimal safe work practices. Even ten percent (10%) can be a dangerous proportion if we are talking about the number of people who acknowledge that “shortcuts” are acceptable behaviour in your workplace. It is important then to review all of the available information provided within this Report.

Some light at the end of the Tunnel

Don’t be too disheartened if you do not see “heaps of green”. Only the “best of the best” shall be able to demonstrate significant slices of Green within their cultural map. It MUST remain your continued goal though to maximise the Green, if you wish to become a Best Practice safety organisation.
## Transformational Safety Leadership Survey

### Individual Form - Abridged Version

**Thank you** for taking the time to complete the Transformational Safety Individual Leadership Survey. It should only take about ten minutes of your time. Remember it is only of value if you are brutally honest in your responses. You gain nothing by pretending.

If you are completing the Survey On-Line click the ‘Submit by Email’ button to submit the survey.

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements.

1 = Strongly Agree  
2 = Agree  
3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree  
4 = Disagree  
5 = Strongly Disagree

### Section 1:

1. I tend to only become involved in safety matters after something has happened  
2. I am pretty “hands-off” when it comes to safety  
3. Things have to be going pretty badly before you see me getting too involved  
4. I avoid getting too involved in safety issues at work, but will if I am asked to

### Section 2:

1. I go out of my way to make my workplace safer  
2. I am serious about how I go about safety matters and believe others would see that in me  
3. I believe the way I personally approach safety inspires those working around me  
4. I feel I am respected by those around me because of the way I approach safety

### Section 3:

1. I take every opportunity I have to promote safety within my workplace  
2. I believe the safety objectives are realistic and I strongly say so to those around me  
3. I am sure I come across as being very committed to safety by those who work with me  
4. People would say I am always optimistic about what we can achieve in safety at this workplace

### Section 4:

1. I listen to many peoples’ point of view before I make any safety decisions  
2. I am always asking different peoples’ opinions about the safest way to do things around here  
3. I actively encourage the people around me to think about safer ways to do things  
4. People know that I shall genuinely listen to their ideas about workplace safety
Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements.

1 = Strongly Agree  
2 = Agree  
3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree  
4 = Disagree  
5 = Strongly Disagree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Keep a close eye out for things being out of place, poor housekeeping etc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Keep a record of safety incidents and will bring them up with those around me</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. I am the one to point out problems in my workplace whenever I see them</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4. People would say I am serious about safety as I am always finding things that are not quite right</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section 6</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. I am always happy to help out with safety matters though there is always something required in return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2. I make it pretty clear what people can expect from me when it comes to safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. I believe having an appropriate safety bonus would result in a safer workplace</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. My approach to safety is that it is all “give and take”; the sooner everybody plays by the rules the safer we will all be</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Add up your scores for each of the Sections and write the results in the boxes provided.

Section 1 (The Fireman)=           Section 2 (The Knight)=           Section 3 (The Motivator)=
Section 4 (The Carer)=             Section 5 (The Policeman)=           Section 6 (The Dealer)=

You now plot your raw scores on the Transformational Safety Leadership Grid. Be careful you plot the correct results against each transformational safety descriptor.

The optimal Transformational Safety Leader consistently demonstrates thoughts and behaviours in the green (best practice) zones. Amber zones are acceptable (good practice); although you should always be striving for green. Red Zones are Danger Zones. You would prefer not to be here.

For a detailed description of the Transformational Safety Culture Improvement System and the Transformational Safety descriptors visit www.transformationalsafety.com

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The phrase Transformational Safety® is a registered trademark and incorporates The Transformational Safety Culture Improvement System, The Transformational Safety Culture Survey, and The Integrated Safety Culture Assessment® Model incorporating the Observational Protocol.
An indictment of shortcut culture

COMMENT
Patrick Walters
23 Jun 07

The 1700-page report of the board of inquiry into the April 2005 Sea King crash presents an appalling indictment of maintenance and management procedures involving naval aviation.

The abject failure to adhere to standard procedures for aircraft maintenance and quality assurance led directly to the tragedy on Nias Island two years ago.

The report chronicles systemic failures and deficient oversight of Sea King helicopter maintenance that became apparent well before the crash.

The Nias tragedy is compounded by the fact that the CO of 817 Squadron, James Tobin, knew months before the accident that there was an embedded "culture of maintenance shortcuts and workarounds" and informed his superiors of this fact.

The maintenance shortcuts that had become routine at the squadron were in part generated by the much higher operational tempo of the Australian Defence Force.

But the report also exposes worrying deficiencies higher up the command chain that made the Nias crash an accident waiting to happen.

Somehow, alarm bells failed to ring up the line that the sub-standard practices being followed at 817 squadron had become routine even in times of low operational tempo.

What was required was a high-level directive to fix the problem once and for all. But confusion about accountability roles and lines of responsibility meant that nothing was done.

The board of inquiry report noted that "senior commanders and managers did not fully understand their responsibilities for airworthiness and there was some confusion with regard to the roles and responsibilities of the ADF airworthiness system".

The report made findings against a number of individuals, including Commander Tobin and one of the navy's most highly regarded officers, Commodore Geoff Ledger, but declined to identify a scale of culpability for the accident.

The navy has already put in place a large number of sweeping changes designed to achieve the overhaul of maintenance and safety culture to help ensure there will never be another Nias.

The board's critical judgments about the performance of key individuals and the unusually large number of deletions made to the final report raise issues of natural justice that will be debated for months to come.
Attachment 12.6

Understanding Employee Morale

1. What is morale?

- Morale – “the state of the spirits of an individual or group as shown in the willingness to perform assigned tasks”\(^{41}\). Morale can also be described as a state of mind, mood, or mental condition\(^{42}\).

2. Why look at employee morale?

- It is **foolish** to ignore, excuse, or otherwise minimise its impact on productivity! The cost of low productivity is incredible for a state like New York with a large government workforce.
- Recent studies have shown that the correlation between the length of time people intend to stay with their current employers and “soft “ factors – like recognition given for work well done or pride in the employer – is more statistically significant that the longevity/monetary award correlation\(^{43}\).
- Generally, increased employee morale means a happier, more productive, and higher performing employee.
- There is a difference between what people do and how they do it.
- The difference between either not meeting, or just meeting, productivity goals – and exceeding goals- for productivity may be attributed to high morale.
- Poor morale is contagious.
- Poor morale can manifest in the use (abuse) of leave accruals, accidents, illnesses, litigation, worker’s compensation claims.
- We generally don’t promote people based on their people skills.

3. What it looks/sounds like:

- Feelings about rules/policies (Strict adherence vs. indifference or resistance)
- Approach to anything new (Excitement or willingness vs. resistance or apathy)
- Expressions regarding longevity (long term outlook vs. wanting to “get out of here”)
- Complaints (Willingness to explore solutions vs. mainly looking for remediation)
- Grievances (Few or many)
- Absences (Many unexcused or Few)
- Accidents/worker’s compensation cases (Frequent or infrequent)
- Interaction among employees (Respectful or disrespectful)

4. What affects/impacts employee morale

- Many things – external and internal to the workplace
  - Communication
  - Downsizing

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\(^{42}\) Bennett, W. & K. Hess (1998), *Management and Supervision in Law Enforcement*, Belmont, CA

\(^{43}\) Marcia L. Weidenmier (2002), *The Dynamics of Non-Financial Value Drivers*, Texas Christian University,
• Retirements
• Reorganisations
• Office environment i.e. decor
• Diversity
• Organisational culture
• Social interactions
• Opportunities for advancement
• “Politics”

5. What to look at

Communication
• Methods (email/intranet, newsletters, memos)
• Regularity (staff meetings, agency wide forums and/or information sessions)
• Content (big picture, too much, too little)
• Types (performance evaluations, vent sessions, opportunities for staff to give feedback)

Rewards/Recognition practices
• Types (verbal, written, ceremony, formal, informal)

Diversity
• Ethnic/Cultural, Structural, Business, Behavioural

Environment
• Office space (size, light, furniture, utilisation)

6. How to assess morale

Ask employees!

Possible questions:

• Do you know the organisation’s mission and vision?
• Do you know how your work contributes to the success or failure of the organisation?
• Have you ever attended a new employee orientation?
• Do you look forward to going to work each day?
• Do you have a good working relationship with your supervisor?
• Are you encouraged by your organisation to develop skills beyond what is basic to your immediate job?
• Do you know what is expected of you in your work?
• How do you feel about your workload?
• Do you feel respected?
• Are your opinions solicited and valued?
• Do you get regular and informative communication from your organisation?
• Do you respect your supervisors, colleagues, and co-workers?
• Do you work in a safe and comfortable environment?
• Is there a clear career path?
• Does the organisational culture support training that would allow you to develop in your career?
• Does the organisation reflect an appreciation of diversity at all levels?
• Does the organisation promote a value of team vs. individual performance?
• Do you get positive feedback when you do a good job?
- Do you have confidence in the people who run the organisation?
- Overall, are you satisfied with your compensation? (especially as it relates to others in your workplace)
- Are employee suggestions taken seriously by your organisation?
- Do you have a feeling of belonging at your workplace?
- Do administrative and technical support systems (telephone systems, personal computer support, email, mail distribution, administrative support) help you to do the best job that you can?
- Do you enjoy your work?
- Do you get regular feedback (both positive and opportunities for improvement) from your supervisor?
- Do you feel that your organisation is efficient in the use of its resources?
- Does the organisation encourage, or punish, innovation and risk-taking?
- Is there anyone within your organisational structure that you would go to with a personal issue?
- Do you feel that your supervisor is supportive when personal issues prevent you from performing as you normally do?

**Observe**

- Is the agency’s mission statement posted conspicuously?
- Is there orientation for new employees?
- Are there policy and procedure manuals readily accessible to employees?
- Does office space facilitate high performance work? (lighting, space, furniture, placement of phones for some level of privacy, noise level)
- Is there a place for the posting of information about what is happening in the agency?
- Does the agency have a newsletter or some other form of interagency communication vehicle?
- During “crisis” times, does communication remain constant, increase, or decrease?
- Are there vehicles for recognising employee performance?
- Is there an employee group that is charged with thinking about recognition for employees?
- Are there forums that would allow for employees to discuss issues affecting the organisation? How is employee input achieved?
- Are there notices posted about training opportunities?
- Does it appear that training for supervisors and managers is strongly encouraged by the organisation?
- Is the “grapevine” used as a potential method for communication?

**Look at systems that are designed to support employees in doing their jobs**

- Does everyone have equal access to computer resources? (intranet, internet)
- If the agency has voice mail, do all employees have it?
- Equipment availability and training (copiers, fax machines, scanners, etc.)
The Transformational Safety® Iceberg

What we have here is an image of the focus of many organisations' attention. Some, more than others, approach these issues with almost religious fervour. As we continue to focus more and more on these traditional outcome metrics, and often using traditional management methods, we actually find downward pressure being placed on the "iceberg". Some of the normally visible outcomes (often near the water line) sink just under the surface. In time we also see (actually we don’t see) the formation of what might be called "reefs".

Let us just consider a few at this point. Most of us know of situations where injuries have been "hidden"; in all sorts of ways. There was the situation where a young man was asked to wait 2-3 hours till end of shift before being transported to the medical centre. As it turned out his leg was broken in two (2) places. Another where there was a high level argument as to whether a worker had received stitches or sutures (I am still scratching the head over that one). It seemed that only stitches needed to be "reported" to the host employer. Or there is the time when conducting an Integrated Safety Culture Assessment, it was suggested that a visit be made to a certain crib hut “out the back”. That just happened to be the "dead man zone" where the “selected duties” employees were housed; playing cards. They were not contributing to LTIFR. We have to ask ourselves what were they doing; other than sending a very powerful visible and behavioural message rippling throughout the business. None of these workplaces had any sort of safety recognition program in place. That is an important point to be addressed a little later.

The above situations are not as unique as we might prefer to think; all the above occurred in large national and multi national organisations. There is an important point here. The senior management are often unaware of the micro methods used by frontline supervisors and middle management to achieve the objectives that have been described to them, and they are often associated with the factors above the water line. They actually think they are doing the "right thing". It is precisely these sorts of behaviours which actively discourage any level of safety participation. The workforce is clearly receiving the message that the safety journey

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is about the massaging and manipulating of circumstances in order to minimise what needs to rise above the water.

It is clear we need to get away from the inclusion of “outcome” results, as regards safety, from within performance contracts etc. Again we certainly do need to “reward” and “recognise”. In the traditional behavioural safety world we might call that “consequences”; that in itself is a science to master in order to make our reward systems support and maximise appropriate outcomes. Therefore, if we engineer our reward systems more toward the implementation and support of safety process measures, the more traditional metrics should look after themselves.

There is ample evidence though which shows that if you want to really “hide” what is going on, as regards safety, you implement a recognition program that rewards only outcome measures. For example, after so many days free of a lost time injury the section gets a “bonus” etc.

In the United States these outcomes based programs have come under the scrutiny of the US Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA). In 2000 a company called USA Waste was fined $65,000 for having a safety incentive program. OSHA cited USA Waste Management of Ohio under 1904.2(a) of the recordkeeping standard (the OSHA 200 Log reporting requirement). USA Waste Management had a bonus pool that rewards employees with excellent safety records. The pool also includes good attendance and good work practices. The citation suggests Waste Management coerced employees to go against medical authorities in order to falsify records. Now this might have been seen as a bit of an extreme call. Nonetheless we can easily see how these sorts of programs actually encourage people to work whilst sick. We already know that such persons are actively “disengaged” and constitute a greater risk to both themselves and those around them.

The key to successful recognition programs is to focus that recognition on process measures. For example if we reward the number of hazards identified, hazards removed, risk assessments, near miss reports etc; we are then going to see significant improvements in the levels of employee participation within your safety systems. This process aligns with the transformational safety construct of “dealing”. Now if that program is partnered with a robust transformational culture built upon the transformational safety leadership competencies, stand back. The levels of safety engagement shall be greater than you have previously experienced.

Let us now look under the waterline of the Transformational Safety ‘Berg.

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Consider many of the “sleepers” under the surface of the iceberg. They tend to have a “personal” or “emotional” meaning for people. Note the several references to various “values” Yet this is where we don’t go too often. Again, It IS the most powerful driver for most of us. This is critically important to appreciate if we are seriously going to try and change the cultural direction of our safety systems.

Look at the floatation scale on the previous image. As we systematically implement transformational safety leadership behaviours within, and throughout, the business, this actually places upward pressure on the iceberg and we begin to see more “stuff” above the surface. I know there are always some people who would prefer not to see some of this “stuff”. It has to be said though that the more of the iceberg which is visible the more likely the business shall avoid the hazard. After all, if it does not sneak up you, you can see it from further away etc. Of course, you also have to be looking!

If we truly want to enhance the level of safety participation within our workplaces we have to direct serious attention to those “under the water-line” factors. We also have to do so using a framework of leadership with a proven ability to enhance the quality of safety relationships, i.e. Transformational Safety® Leadership.
Attachment 12.8
TransformationalSafety.Com’s SAFE-T-SOS (BBS) POWER® Paks

The SAFE-T-SOS Behavioural Systems are a bespoke collection of safety solutions which are underpinned by the World’s most contemporary safety system technologies. Whilst they have a significant exposure to the science of applied behavioural psychology they are not modelled on the traditional behaviour based safety products offered to the market by companies such as Du-Pont, BST, QSE, etc.

What set’s the SAFE-T-SOS Behavioural Systems apart from the remainder of the safety offerings available today, is their fundamental foundations within the Transformational Safety® Model; developed by globally recognised safety psychologist David G Broadbent.

The Transformational Safety® Model is grounded within the powerful Transformational Safety® Leadership competencies. Indeed the “T” which is found within all of the SAFE-T-SOS Modules is, very specifically placed, to demonstrate the critical role that “Transformational Safety®” plays as the glue that welds the SAFE-T-SOS modules to sustained proactive positive safety outcomes.

The most common metaphor for understanding behavioural feedback mechanisms within personal safety decision systems can be considered the ABC Model. A = Activators/Antecedents; B = Behaviours; and C = Consequences. For a thorough understanding of how the ABC model applies to Safety you are referred to the UK Health and Safety Executive.

The ABC model is used within the vast majority of behaviour base safety (BBS) management systems. Regrettfully, the power of the relationship between these three discreet metaphors are rarely maximised. TransformationalSafety.Com’s SAFE-T-SOS behavioural systems develop a number of discreet SAFE-T-MODULES which are targeted to achieve inclusive outcomes at, and within, each stage of the ABC framework. There is a defined order of presentation with regard to SAFE-T-SOS Modules.

In short this is:-

1. SAFE-T-START
2. SAFE-T-SCAN
3. SAFE-T-TRAIN
4. SAFE-T-VIEW
5. SAFE-T-COACH
6. SAFE-T-SENTINEL
7. SAFE-T-WALK
8. SAFE-T-SCRATCH

Strategies to promote safe behaviour as part of a health and safety management system – Contract Research Report: 430/2002
Before I provide further detail as to the actual SAFE-T-MODULES describe above it is worth spending some time realigning with the basic tenets of the ABC Model. The first thing to recognise here is that the depiction of the Model above, is in its simplest form – and is actually quite deceptive. For the ABC Model to have any chance of being successful it must be understood as a sequential feedback loop (see below).

Once we see the decisional feedback loop in operation, the temporal location of each of the SAFE-T-SOS Modules begin to make more sense. For example it has commonly been determined that in incidents/accidents for which a personal behavioural element has been present, a significant input to any sub-optimal decision making could be found within the broad construct known as “pre-task planning”.

What is also very clear here is the SAFE-T-LEADER element maintaining a key location within the Model. Not only do the safety leadership competencies developed from the SAFE-T-LEADER program act as an umbrella protecting those elements below; it also consistently feeds positively into all stages of the traditional BBS ABC framework.

Within traditional BBS systems we see a significant focus on trying to identify “unsafe acts” and to then “condition” these acts out of the workforce; by way of consistent
observation/feedback processes. Within immature safety cultures this approach can provide some immediate positive outcomes. That is due to the identification and visualisation of what we call the “low hanging fruit”. The evidence from within the empirical community is that many BBS systems struggle to retain relevance and momentum in the medium to longer term. We believe that is partly due to the continual repetitiveness of the “intervention” and a failure to recognise the power of “transformational” systems.

As an example we draw attention to the STOP® Card system promoted by Du Pont. There are many other companies who have created very similar products which attempt to focus an employee on the task at hand, specifically with regard to their behaviour. All of these systems either fail to provide feedback in a timely fashion (that is actually relevant), or not at all. If any of these systems require the employee to write/tick on the form, and there is no genuine timely feedback provided, they quickly are recognised as an administrative tool – and employees do not treat them seriously. Why should they? If the company saw the data as "significant" they would take the time to demonstrate that significance to the workforce.

Within the SAFE-T-SOS behavioural systems we recognise that setting up “false” expectations, or expectations that the business is unlikely to achieve, is tantamount to setting up a system to fail – at the outset. It is for that reason that the SAFE-T-MODULES which have been designed to focus upon pre-task planning do not require the “tick & flick”, that is so often problematic. At the outset we make it clear to all the “players” that the role of the SAFE-T-START and SAFE-T-SCAN cards are solely to encourage employees to better appreciate the value of pre-task planning. By teaching all the “players” the Transformational Safety Leadership competencies, and encouraging the active application of same within all levels of the workforce – particularly at the interface between supervision and pre-task planning, we see an eighty percent plus (80%+) application rate for both SAFE-T-START and SAFE-T-SCAN. Internal surveys of alternate systems has indicated that upwards of seventy percent (70%) of employees “tick and flick” pre-task forms without even looking, or compete them at the end of the shift for placement in “the box” etc. In such circumstances businesses are investing as lot of time/energy/money in a manipulated invalid safety system. Any data that is drawn from it, and subsequently acted upon, is based upon a mirage.

The SAFE-T-SOS behavioural systems consist of:-

- **SAFE-T-LEADER©**

  The SAFE-T-LEADER program is a key element of the SAFE-T-SOS Behavioural Systems. This is a senior leadership intervention that is explicitly targeted at developing an understanding of the exothermic power of Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL) competencies. It is delivered using a coaching feedback model founded on the results senior leaders review through the implementation of the TSL-360.

  It is when SAFE-T-LEADER has begun to gain some “energy” within the business that we then begin the development of the remaining SAFE-T-SOS modules. This ensures that we maximise the safety leadership culture (through expanding transformational safety leadership competencies). By so doing we provide a solid foundation toward success.

- **SAFE-T-START©**

  The SAFE-T-START© Card is a pocket reference card which is required to be carried by all employees. The purpose of the SAFE-T-START© Card is to focus an employee on a range of issues relating to the work task about to be performed (pre-performance planning). Through the active and continued encouragement of the use of the SAFE-T-START© Card, by all employees, we are aiming to minimize the use of the “auto-pilot” functions associated with occupational performance. The SAFE-T-START© Card takes the employee through a staged exploration of common hazards associated
with a range of work tasks. TransformationalSafety.Com develops unique SAFE-T-START® Cards for different areas of the workforce. For example the SAFE-T-START® Card required by an Electrician might be quite different to what would be required for a Painter.

- **SAFE-T-SCAN®**

  The SAFE-T-SCAN® Mini Risk Assessment is the next step in the behavioural chain of decision making. Whilst the SAFE-T-START® Card introduces the employee to an elemental consideration of the general requirements that they may confront within their work task, the SAFE-T-SCAN® takes that consideration to the next level.

  The SAFE-T-SCAN® Mini Risk Assessment takes employees through a four (4) step process which culminates in a decision to either proceed with the task, proceed with the task following further education/equipment/PPE provision etc., or abandon the task - and seek an alternate methodology.

  The four steps of the SAFE-T-SCAN® are:-

  1. Identify the Hazards
  2. Ask the What If Questions
  3. Determine the Risk Exposure
  4. Implement Control Measures

  The SAFE-T-SCAN® four (4) step process leverages the seminal influence of Operational Risk Management (ORM); a key hazard management tool of many military organizations around the World. Remember military operations are the one workplace where your competitor is out to kill/maim you. Therefore the hazard and risk management approaches, by definition, need to have the ability to function within toxic work environments. Whilst we would hope that other work environments do not confront that level of occupational toxicity, there is great advantage in using ORM tools as a mechanism to influence safer work behaviours within our own workplaces.

  The SAFE-T-SCAN® is used in situations where an employee has referred/considered their SAFE-T-START® Card and there remains some niggling doubt as to the safe operation of the task at hand. By applying the staged process within the SAFE-T-SCAN®, the employee more deeply embeds pre-behavioural thinking in the cognitive chain of decision making.

- **SAFE-T-VIEW®**

  The SAFE-T-VIEW® Observational Process is a fundamental element of TransformationalSafety.Com's SAFE-T-SOS Behavioural Safety Systems. It is the observation-feedback process that is the cornerstone of ninety percent plus (90+%) of behavioural safety systems.

  The "observational process" though is a means to an end, and we at TransformationalSafety.Com take a very unique approach to maximizing leverage from the interactions around observed behaviour. Remember that one of the initial steps when designing an observational process for your workplace is defining safe/unsafe observable behaviours and creating a simple pro forma/checklist for the recording of task observations against those parameters. As time goes by, if all goes according to the traditional behavioural model (life is rarely that kind), you shall begin to see far more "safe" behaviours than the "unsafe". In other words the requirement to provide constructive feedback
around correcting unsafe behaviours shall diminish. After all, that is why you have jumped aboard the BBS train, is it not?

Remember what "C" stands for in the A-B-C behavioural feedback model. It stands for "Consequences". What that means is that the "communication" that occurs, at the point-of-contact, is the critical point in the behavioural observation process. You can stand around and record as much safe/unsafe behaviour as you like; if you don't manage to utilize that opportunity to encourage those people observed to continue and see value in the "safe" way of doing things, your BBS Process shall fail. For heaven’s sake do not make the mistake of thinking that pretty charts showing the ratio of safe/unsafe behaviours is a good indicator of how things are going. It might only take ONE unsafe behaviour, in combination with a process fault or two, for something to go "bang". Not a good outcome for anyone.

TransformationalSafety.Com aligns the SAFE-T-VIEW® Observational Process with the SAFE-T-COACH© Program. By so doing we ensure that all Behavioural Observers have an opportunity to develop particular competencies around coaching and feedback mechanisms. The safety literature clearly tells us the application of Transformational Safety competencies lead to higher levels of Safety Engagement. It has also been shown that the greater the level of Safety Engagement, within the workplace, the higher level of discretionary behaviours around the safety equation. To put that another way; ensuring that the behavioural observation process incorporates transformational safety communication competencies at the point of contact, we actually end up making a contribution at the "A" point on the A-B-C behavioural feedback model. That is the ultimate goal of any behavioural safety system; to modify the behaviour of employees to a point where they make "safe" decisions as a matter of course. Not unlike the reaching for the seat-belt for many of us.

- **SAFE-T-TRAIN®**

TransformationalSafety.Com holds firmly to the view that any effective behavioural safety management system must involve continuous training in the workplace safety procedures that employees are expected to follow - these might be called Principles of Operation. Further to that operational training, TransformationalSafety.Com ensures that all employees receive developmental training in the competencies associated with the application of the TransformationalSafety Leadership Model. At the operator level we refer to this as Transformational Communication. In actual fact the "T" that you find referenced in all the BBS POWER® PAKS refers specifically to the application of the Transformational Safety® Leadership (TSL) competencies within the underlying framework of the System itself. It is the integration of the Transformational Safety Model (developed by TransformationalSafety.Com) within the POWER PAKS that adds a level of discretionary safety behaviour within the safety system itself.

- **SAFE-T-COACH©**

The SAFE-T-COACH© Program is a key POWER-PAK within the POWER BBS System. It is regularly introduced in partnership with the SAFE-T-VIEW® Observational Protocol. That is because of our fundamental belief that the POWER of a self-sustaining behavioural observation program is the application of the "T" - Transformational Safety Leadership competencies.

Responsible organizations cannot rely solely on their management team, or their professional safety personnel, to coach and communicate safety and occupational health issues. Long term success depends on leaders who can
develop partnerships with team members to address vital safety issues. The SAFE-T-COACH® Workshop is based on the same principles of the original Coaching Skills workshop. Safety Coaching is designed to train participants with practical and effective coaching skills that can be applied when influencing others, working through obstacles, and creating a shared commitment to safety issues.

**Participants Will Learn How To:**

- Build a positive and supportive working relationship with others.
- Implement the Transformational Safety® Leadership (TSL) competencies within their normal day-to-day interactions at the workplace.
- Maximize safety performance by using the G.R.O.W.E. Coaching Model.
- Build a positive and supportive working relationship with others.
- Ensure that others have a commitment to and follow through on safety issues.
- Involve all team members in contributing to the safe operation of the business.

**SAFE-T-WALK©**

The SAFE-T-WALK© is a senior leadership visibility program. Too often senior leaders within the business “talk the talk” when it comes to safety; although when it comes to putting all that “talk” into action there are significant gaps identified. We know, without any doubt whatsoever, that the Transformational Safety Leadership we have called “The Invisible Man” can be toxic when its presence is aligned with a developing behavioural safety intervention. It is for that reason that we always implement the SAFE-T-WALK© within all of our behavioural based systems. Leaders may say they have conflicting priorities, and we acknowledge that they do. The reality though is so too do their at-risk operational employees. If a senior leader gives in to these “conflicts”, then when their employees take a “shortcut” to deliver a process “quicker”, in many cases they are really just mirroring the behaviours they are seeing from within the senior leadership team. SAFE-T-WALKS® should never be optional.

**SAFE-T-SENTINEL©**

The existence of SAFE-T-SENTINEL’s is the ultimate goal of any proactive and mature safety aware organisation. The SAFE-T-SENTINEL© is a specific intervention which may be implemented within an organisation at a time when the more traditional behavioural observational programs have taken root. Once we have a significant population within the organisation who have been trained in the competencies associated with SAFE-T-COACH® and SAFE-T-VIEW©; we are in a better position to strategically implement the SAFE-T-SENTINEL© intervention. It is at the point when the majority of the workforce has acquired the skills of safe/unsafe observations, safety focussed communications, the application of TSL within their day-to-day workplace interventions, that we can set the Sentinels free.

So what is a SAFE-T-SENTINEL©. A Sentinel is something that is forever “searching” or “on guard” for something. In the environment of a BBS POWER integrated program, the SAFE-T-SENTINEL is an identity free application of the principles of SAFE-T-VIEW without the formalised structure. What this means is that an organisation is releasing the intellectual capital it has created via the implementation of SAFE-T-VIEW. As an employee is involved in a Sentinel interaction they mark it on their Sentinel I-Check. Sentinel I-Checks are submitted on an agreed basis and the data tracked using similar methodologies
to SAFE-T-VIEW. The SAFE-T-SENTINEL adds a level of POWER to the entire program by making every employee (irrespective of employee level) a potential SAFE-T-SENTINEL. When you have an effective SAFE-T-SENTINEL program functioning within the business you are potentially recognising over ninety percent (90%) of unsafe behaviours. Hazard recognition is arguably the most significant aspect of behavioural accident control. If you haven’t seen it (recognised), then you really can’t deal with it (control).

Every organisation’s ultimate goal should be the effective application of the SAFE-T-SENTINEL program.

SAFE-T-SCRATCH®

The SAFE-T-SCRATCH Program is a positive behaviour recognition program. Behavioural psychology models powerfully demonstrate a strong relationship between positive reinforcement (recognition) and sustained behavioural change. The converse is true in the case of what is known as negative reinforcement (punishment). TransformationalSafety.Com has recognised the value of positive behavioural reinforcement and has developed the SAFE-T-SCRATCH program. SAFE-T-SCRATCH, on its own, is not unique. There are many forms of positive recognition programs that use a “scratch” metaphor. SAFE-T-SCRATCH adds value to these more traditional interventions by attaching “randomness” to the “recognition”. Studies have shown that when there is a random pattern to the “existence” and “value” of the Reward; the desired behaviour is maximised, when compared to the “always” reward programs.

TransformationalSafety.Com’s SAFE-T-SCRATCH program is also only implemented following the roll-out of SAFE-T-COACH. This is a deliberate strategy so that we maximise the traditional results of a “scratchie” based incentive program, whilst ensuring that we give the results the exothermic power of applied transformational communication competencies at the point of integration with the workforce. We believe that the true power of the SAFE-T-SCRATCH program comes from the quality of the communication at the point of “hand-over”.

Whilst the SAFE-T-SOS Behavioural Systems are an integrated solutions package, the true energy comes from the ability to harness the power of Transformational Safety Leadership competencies as they become embedded within the intra-psychic organisational systems. To that end, TransformationalSafety.Com is further able to engineer bespoke solutions which add the synergies of Transformational Safety Leadership within many organisations current systems.

For further information with regard to the SAFE-T-SOS Behavioural Systems, and how they might become the optimal solution for your safety improvement, contact the creator (David G Broadbent) of TransformationalSafety.Com.

David G Broadbent
Safety Psychologist
TransformationalSafety.Com
About TransformationalSafety.Com

TransformationalSafety.Com is a discreet business unit of Strategic Management Systems Pty Ltd. Strategic Management Systems Pty Ltd has 3 core business units:-

- The Leadership College
- TransformationalSafety.Com
- The Safety Site

The Leadership College specialises in personal leadership development, individual coaching for improved work performance, leadership and organisational assessments, and organisational development, consultation and planning. For several years we have been heavily involved in the relationships between safety outcomes and the many factors which contribute to safe work performance. For almost a decade Strategic Management Systems has maintained the highest sustained Return to Work Rates of any jurisdiction throughout the global community. From that involvement, and the request of many of our customers we have formalised that part of our business model via the evolution of TransformationalSafety©.Com.

We employ state of the art cultural models and business and leadership principles to help clients achieve the greatest effectiveness and success within their organisation and maximise an ability to compete in a rapidly changing marketplace.

The organisational, business and leadership principles used most frequently are not particularly effective in today's chaotic business world. Workplace safety continues to remain elusive for many; despite the "buckets of money" often thrown at it. Research has shown, for many years, that poor safety culture directly leads to poor safety outcomes. The impact of safety leadership within the cultural model cannot be overstated. TransformationalSafety©.Com is the global leader in the application of transformational leadership principles as a powerful vehicle for maximising safety outcomes via cultural change.

We emphasise lasting results! And we carefully screen our clients to ensure a good match between our expertise and our clients' needs. Our organisational clients include profit and non-profit organisations of all sizes.

We look forward to bringing the synergies of our strategic partnership to the world of safety.
The Transformational Safety Improvement System is the only safety culture developmental program that has been fundamentally constructed around the principle of transformational leadership theory.

Global research in safety outcomes continues to demonstrate the point of difference is the application of effective safety leadership.

The Transformational Safety Survey is the only intervention which shall allow you to assess your safety leadership from within a transformational framework, whilst concurrently exploring traditional safety culture constructs.